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The European Forum, set up in 1992 by the High Council, is 
a Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University 
Institute in Florence. Its aim is to bring together in a given 
academic year high-level experts on a particular theme, giv­
ing prominence to international, comparative and interdisci­
plinary aspects of the subject. It furthers the co-ordination and 
comparison of research in seminars, round-tables and confer­
ences attended by Forum members and invited experts, as 
well as teachers and researchers of the Institute. Its research 
proceedings are published through articles in specialist jour­
nals, a thematic yearbook and EUI Working Papers.
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 
1994/5 European Forum programme on ‘Gender and the Use 
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B. A linguistic panorama of Spain
C. Language and collective identities in Catalonia
D . Conflicting identities and political patterns
E. Language and nationalist ideologies
(The politics of language and identity in Catalonia)
Note: I would like to thank my colleagues at 
the European Forum, EUI for their comments 
on this paper when it was presented at the 
Forum's March conference, as well as to a 
second paper presented in one of the seminars. 
My heartfelt gratitude to Alison Frost, for her 































































































































































































The Iberian Peninsula is home to two of Europe's longest-standing 
modern states. They came into being at the end of the 15th century 
as the 'Reconquest' 1 of Iberian territories by the Christian 
monarchies reached its conclusion, putting an end to an Arab- 
Muslim presence in the Peninsula that had stretched over nearly
1 This term is an obvious euphemism, loaded with ethnocentric 
overtones, which simplifies historical occurences which unfolded 
over seven or eight centuries! The concept 'Reconquest' does little 
justice to the complexity of historical facts. However, it is difficult to 
find an alternative term which concisely synthesizes the long-term 





























































































eight centuries. These two emerging polities were definitively 
consolidated in the 16th century, a period during which both of 
them experienced a rapid transoceanic expansion and established 
far-reaching colonial trade routes and empires under the auspices 
of the Lusitanian and Castilian monarchies.
Portugal is a paradigmatic example of a nation state, due 
both to its internal ethno-cultural homogeneity and the centuries- 
old stability of its borders, following its establishment as an 
independent political entity. The compact nature of the Portuguese 
polity is clearly expressed at the linguistic level. With the exception 
of certain minor dialectical variations, for centuries the only 
language spoken throughout this territory has been Portuguese 2. 
The language and the polity itself both have medieval origins. The 
Galician-Portuguese entity split in two at a time when the 
Christian frontier was being pushed southwards. The Portuguese 
polity achieved independence from its Asturian and Leonese 
neighbours about half way through the 12th century, before its 
southward territorial expansion was completed. In contrast, parts 
of what is now Galicia—as well as the Kingdom of Leon—turned 
their gaze eastwards and eventually aligned themselves with the 
Kingdom of Castile, by means of specific treaties and dynastic 
unions.
The trajectory of the Spanish polity is less straightforward 
than that of Portugal, being the result of a more convoluted 
historical process. The Kingdom of Castile-Leon was the axis 
around which a genuinely 'Hispanic' monarchy (i.e. one with an 
undoubted hegemony in the Peninsula) was established at the 
beginning of the Modern Age. Yet, it never really became—even at
2 On the linguistic dimension, see: Miquel Siguan Linguistic Minorities 
in the European Economic Community: Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
summary of the report commissioned by the European Communities. 





























































































the height of its military and political power—a 'nation' in the 
strict modern sense of the term; that is to say an institutionally 
well integrated and socio-culturally homogeneous polity. The 
Kingdom of Castile comprised a conglomerate of old kingdoms 
and peninsular seigniories, each with its own institutions and 
political-cultural profile. There was, however, a powerful 
monarchy at its helm which was to become the true driving force 
behind its southerly territorial expansion. Castile culminated its 
centuries-long expansion with the capture of Granada in 1492. In 
the euphoria brought about by the incorporation of the Kingdom 
of Granada into her Crown, the Catholic Queen Isabel succumbed 
to Christopher Columbus persistent proposals and embarked 
Castile on a whirlwind transatlantic adventure and a subsequent 
quest for global power.
The enormity of the task which the discoveries of Columbus 
opened up for Castile—particularly if we consider the lean 
material and human resource base of the Kingdom—left little time 
or energy for domestic issues; unless they involved the collection 
of taxes and duties necessary to sustain the imperial effort, either 
from the Queen's own Castilian subjects or from those of the 
other confederated kingdoms when their respective institutions 
agreed to pay the contributions demanded of them. In reality, no 
one in the Court of Castile—or at least no one before Count Duke 
of Olivares 3 —seems to have been particularly anxious to 
promote a consistent policy of integration and heightened 
cohesion (a sort of 'nation-building' policy if you wish) in the 
metropolitan realm. Priority at the time was given to constructing 
a strong state and a powerful monarchy, capable of ruling over a
3 On the other hand, the Machiavellian inspiration of Count-Duke of 
Olivares' policies—which shows more clearly in the proposals put 
forward to the King in a famous and widely cited report, ostensibly 
with the aim of outlining how to attain a more homogeneous nation 





























































































vast empire with territories in three continents. The Spanish case 
is thus characterised by the early establishment of a powerful 
bureaucratic state, and in retrospect by the neglect and failure in 
the building of an integrated nation 4.
The third main protagonist in the Peninsula was the Aragon, 
encompassing the former Kingdom of Valencia and the 
Principality of Catalonia. The Pledge of Caspe of 1412 was 
instrumental in bringing together the constituent parts of the 
Kingdom of Aragon. Later on, the marriage of Isabel, Queen of 
Castile, and Fernando, King of Aragon, brought about the alliance 
of these two major peninsular entities. Yet, this was to take the 
form of a purely dynastic union, a confederation of kingdoms 
which maintained mutual independence. The specific institutions 
of the constituent entities remained largely intact. Each of them 
retained legislative, fiscal and political autonomy. To the north, 
the old Kingdom of Navarre became a part of the Crown of 
Castille in 1515, even though maintaining its specific institutions 
and privileges. Moreover, from 1580 to 1640, King Philip II of 
Hapsburg became—by dint of dynastic and hereditary chances— 
the King of Portugal, as well as of many other kingdoms and 
principalities in the Peninsula and elsewhere in Europe.
The tremendous power apportioned by its colonial 
possessions made Castile the hegemonic actor in the Iberian 
Peninsula, and a very important one in Europe, at least 
throughout the 16th century. The Kingdom of Aragon, however,
4 On this particular issue, see J.H. Elliot's works on Hapsburg Spain and 
specifically on the Conde-Duque de Olivares. Also very useful and 
enlightning is the historical synthesis worked out by Juan J. Linz 'Early 
state building and late peripheral nationalisms against the state: The 
case of Spain' in S.N. Eisenstadt, S. Rokkan eds. Building States and 
Nations Beverly Hills, Ca: Sage, 1973, pages 33-59. The best known 
philosophical and political interpretation—and no doubt the one 
provoking most controversy—about Spain's historical lack of 





























































































excluded from the Atlantic adventure, fell into an ever sharper 
economic and political decline—a decline already observable from 
the mid fifteenth century—and found itself overshadowed by 
Castile, which became the true power base of the Monarchy. The 
Spanish monarchs soon saw themselves playing big global 
politics, and domestic issues came a poor second to the demands of 
ruling a vast empire. Thus, by accentuating its absolutist 
strategies—first and foremost in the realm of Castile proper—the 
Monarchy effectively built a powerful bureaucratic state 
apparatus which served as the backbone of a vast empire. Yet, in 
the end it failed to construct a well integrated and articulated 
polity overall, a modern nation.
What has so far been said by way of a summary contains 
arguable historical simplifications. In fact, some important events 
during the 16th century reveal the determination of the Monarchy 
and the state to more tightly unify and homogenise the Peninsular 
kingdoms. The same year of the conquest of Granada and the start 
of the Atlantic adventure, Isabella and Fernando agreed to sign 
the decrees presented to them by their respective bureaucrats 
ordaining the forcible conversion of the Spanish Jewry on threat 
of exile from Sefarad. Later on, during the reign of Philip II, the 
policies of the Consejo de Castilla led to persecutions, 
displacements and deportations of the moorish populations that 
had remained in Iberia after their masters had been defeated and 
driven back to their north-African and Arab 'homelands'. Under 
Philip III the remaining moriscos—about three hundred thousand 
in all—were eventually expelled from beautiful Al-Andalus 5.
5 On the Spanish jewry sge Jose Amador de los Rios (1875) Historia de 
los Judios de Espafia y Portugal Madrid: Turner, 1984. On the moriscos 
see: Antonio Dominguez Ortiz; Bernard Vincent (1978) Historia de los 





























































































Moreover, potential heterodox and restless subjects had to 
be kept under close watch. Thus, the Santa Inquisition was 
established, as a tool for pursuing ideological and religious 
uniformity and political conformity. The establishment of the 
Inquisition reveals a neat convergence of the interests of Church 
and State, which is quite disturbing. These policies aimed at 
excluding the internal Other were to a certain extent driven by 
anxiety on the part of the Monarchy over the machinations of the 
enemy within, in conspiracy with its powerful enemies without. 
Doubtlessly they were also fuelled by internal strife and the 
ambition of the powerful within the state apparatus to attain 
political objectives by the exclusion of potential competitors. In its 
turn, the Monarchy found justification for its policies in the need 
to pursue transcendental ends such as preserving Western 
Christianity from its heathen enemies and building a more tightly 
integrated kingdom.
In any case, the aforementioned measures of exclusion of the 
internal Other and enforced ideological-religious uniformity— 
justified by evoking the primordial interests of the the State and 
those of a self-appointed Catholic Monarchy—have to be judged 
against the background of more general circumstances and events 
taking place in Europe and the Mediterranean at the time: the 
onset of the Reformation in Central Europe (and the Counter- 
Reformation organised as a sort of antidote); the Turkish threat in 
the Mediterranean; and the acute political and ideological 
rivalries between the various monarchies, striving for hegemony 
on European soil.
With the establishment of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain at 
the beginning of the 18th century—following a War of Succession 
in which other European powers were involved, given the 
strategic interests at stake—certain 'nation-building' policies (to 
continue using this quite misleading term) acquired more 
prominence than ever before. These policies were of French 
import and, to a certain extent, the product of enlightened 




























































































attain a greater degree of administrative, institutional and 
cultural integration of the diverse entities which constituted the 
Spanish metropolitan state. As part of this effort to renew the 
basis of the nation-state, the rebellious Catalan elites —who had 
sided with the pretender from the House of Austria in the War of 
Succession—suffered retaliation and were stripped of some of 
their powers. Thus, the Constitutions which formed the basis of 
Catalonia's political autonomy were abolished—although the 
Principality was allowed to maintain some of its common and civil 
law institutions—and the Catalan language was excluded from 
the administration, the judiciary and education, and other public 
spheres.
The exclusion of the vernacular language from the public 
sphere, which undoubtedly affected its literary and erudite 
development, doesn't seem to have had too adverse an effect on 
the development of the spoken language, the living language of 
the people. This is at least a plausible hypothesis, since the 'public 
sphere' was surely only of marginal importance in common 
people's lives at the time. In this latest respect, the educational 
laws passed in the mid nineteenth century by liberal-revolutionary 
regimes (most notably the Moyano Bill of 1857) doubtlessly posed 
more of a threat to the survival the Catalan language, as well as 
the other 'regional' minority languages. In this legislation, which 
aimed at establishing a system of compulsory schooling 
throughout the national territory, it was ruled that Castilian 
would become the sole language of instruction. These political and 
administrative measures would have had a devastating effect on 
the languages other than Castilian were it not for the utter 
inefficiency of the Spanish state and successive governments.
Political and ideological inspiration for the above mentioned 
measures was once again coming from the other side of the 
Pyrenees. Yet, be it for better or for worse, Spain is not quite like 
France, nor can Madrid as a capital city compare with Paris! 
Besides, the winds of Romanticism and those billowing the sails of 




























































































to blow strongly across the lands of Central Europe at the time. 
Thus, a number of revivalist movements in favour of the 
vernaculars and the recovery of regional traditions set on the 
Spanish peripheries. The most important one caught on among 
the Barcelona elites around the middle of the century. This 
movement was eventually labelled theRenaixenga, a rebirth of 
Catalan culture, language and political consciousness. The 
Catalan Renaixenga, which placed great emphasis on the 
recovery of the vernacular —first for literary purposes, later on in 
education and all other spheres of life—, received a strong 
impulse due to important changes occurring throughout the 
region. A new vigour was apparent in the economy and in 
industry, in contrast with a largely backward interior Spain, 
largely dependent on agriculture. The Romanticist ideals, and 
similar revivalist movements taking place elsewhere in Europe at 
the time, provided intellectual and political inspiration. The 
Catalan language thus became a banner which served as a 
powerful symbolic representation of the aspirations of the 
successful industrialists and the political and cultural elites in their 
orbit6.
Meanwhile, poor old Spain as a whole was going downhill 
fast. At the very beginning of the nineteenth century it had been 
shamefully invaded by the armies of Napoleon, a drunken puppet 
king put on the throne (Napoleon's brother). As it happened, there 
was some patriotic pride and strength left, though. People all over 
Spain raised up against the invader and drove it back north of the 
Pyrenees. The task left behind was for the political classes to
6 See: Pierre Vilar Cataluna en la Espana Moderna Barcelona: Critica, 
1978: 51-102. Also, the interesting second chapter of the book by Josep 
M. Fradera Cultura nacional en una societat dividida Barcelona: 
Curial, 1992. A fundamental book on the development of the 
intellectual debate between people placed in the Catalan and Castilian 
cultural spheres is the monographic study by Horst Hina (1985) Castilla 



























































































collect and reassemble the pieces of a rundown state. Further 
misfortunes were in store, however, since the same ideals that 
inspired the afrancesados liberals at home, were also setting on 
fire the imagination of creole elites from Cartagena de Indias 
down to Buenos Aires. In addition, these elites were receiving 
political inspiration from their neighbour to the north. One by one, 
the American colonies declared themselves independent nations, 
breaking away from the metropolitan 'motherland'. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, Spain had been brought to its knees and 
made to retreat to more domestic preoccupations by an emerging 
nation state that was to become the most powerful of its time, the 
United States of America. With the loss of the last Caribbean 
colonies, political misery, moral decadence and intellectual 
obsession with the fate of the nation took hold on the barren 
mesetas of central Iberia.
A dispirited, decadent and powerless Spain could hardly 
manage to hold together its constituent entities anymore. 
Profound economic, social and cultural cleavages separating 
centre from periphery —as well as maintaining the distance 
between a heterogeneous mélange of elites entrenched in their 
privileges and the increasingly impoverished rural and urban 
lower classes—made it extremely difficult to hold the fold 
together. The choir of centrifugal voices was ever growing, more 
strongly from the northeastern periphery. Political strife, 
outbursts of violence, dictatorship and open war was the result. 
The politically turbulent years of the turn of the century witnessed 
hopeful political developments in Catalonia in what concerns 
political devolution. The Mancomunitat de Catalunya was 
established in 1914. Yet, this limited experiment in political self­
management did not last long. Primo de Rivera's dictatorship put 
an end to it in 1923.
The fall of the dictatorship and the establishment of the 
Second Republic raised high hopes in Catalonia as in the rest of 
progressive Spain. But they were again frustrated by the military 



























































































- 1 2 -
provoked a war. The outcome of the Civil War (1936-39) was the 
installation in Spain of a dictatorial regime and, turning to what 
concerns us here, the most aggressive measures in Spanish history 
against the minority languages, and Catalan in particular. These 
measures were part and parcel of a fully-fledged attempt to build 
a definitively Unitarian, uniform and monolithic nation state (in 
short, a totalitarian state) in all spheres. The ideological wings of 
Francoism —as well as the iron wings of its armies—were pushed 
on by the cold winds which blew strongly from Central Europe at 
the time. But the tragedies awaiting Europe were about to make 
those of Spain look small by comparison. All in the name of a 
greater nation, a purified race, total justice and absolute truths. In 
short, the game of nation-states competing for an ever increasing 
share of power carried to its most terrifying 'logical' conclusion.
Fortunately, the strength of certain social realities 
sometimes foil the attempts of those who, using the harshest and 
most violent means, try to eradicate them. After the dictator's 
death, and once the transition to democracy was under way, the 
realities of Spain's diversity and plurality powerfully burst forth 
once more, perhaps more strongly than ever before. The crisis of 
legitimacy which the Spanish state underwent during the return to 
a monarchical regime and democracy, unleashed a variety of 
centrifugal forces. In certain peripheries of the country, these 
forces rallied mainly under the banner of political autonomy and 
nationalism, in a tremendous struggle for restitution, identity and 
political dignity. The emergence of these strong centrifugal forces 
presented a serious threat to the viability of the new regime and of 
the State itself. In this respect, the wide political consensus 
reached in the elaboration and approval of the Constitution of 
1978 was a solid cornerstone on which democratic institutions 
would develop, putting the transition process on a steady track. 
The Constitution and the consensus that made it possible acted as 





























































































The Spanish Constitution of 1978 fully recognises political 
and cultural regional diversity. Section VIII lays down the bases 
for a new territorial organisation of the state and, in the famous 
Article 3 of the Preamble, one finds the legal provisions that 
recognise and provide for the development of linguistic pluralism 
in particular 7. Thus, the transition from an authoritarian- 
dictatorial to a democratic regime saw a fundamental parallel 
transformation of a centralist and monolithic state into one that is 
considerably decentralised and pluralistic. Aspirations to 
uniformity were replaced by tolerance and an express 
institutionalisation of cultural diversity. What could be considered 
a basic weakness—that is, the problematical political articulation 
and territorial integration of the Spanish polity due to complex 
historical, geographical, economic and cultural factors—has been 
made into a virtue, a plural and decentralised system, in this new 
historic era. The results are more than remarkable, although the 
process of reorganisation of the state along the lines mentioned 
has not been culminated yet.
The comparative historical failure of Spain as a nation-state 
—if, for example, we compare it with the French paradigm—can 
be largely explained by its specific political and dynastic history. 
Nevertheless, other factors which help explain Spain's lack of 
internal cohesion should also be taken into account. What I have in 
mind are various geographical, macroeconomic and sociological 
factors. In this respect, I find the concept of ‘lines of cleavage' to be 
particularly useful. Cleavages—whether they be of an economic,
7 In a recent article in El Pais (24 de febrero 1994) Jordi Sole Tura, one of 
the persons directly involved in the drafting of the 1978 Constitution, 
evokes the process which allowed for a broad consensus, that was 
reflected, for example, in the wording of the articles concerning the 
status of Spanish and the other languages. This consensus was 
maintained at the regional level during the drafting of the Catalan 
Statute and the Law of Linguistic Normalisation. In his analysis, Sole 
Tura points out what were the reasonable limits which the legislators 




























































































sociocultural, political or religious nature—are complexly 
interwoven, they overlap and may eventually reinforce one 
another. This concept, developed by Stein Rokkan and associate 
researchers, has been applied extensively by Juan J. Linz in his 
studies into the Spanish case 8. Fundamental differing interests 
between centre and periphery, and non-congruence in the location 
of economic potential and political power, are no doubt factors of 
great explanatory value for the Spanish case, notwithstanding the 
specific importance of cultural and linguistic diversity 9. However, 
since the more specific object of this essay is to describe and 
analyse the 'language issue' in its basic coordinates, and to 
highlight its current implications in the Spanish political arena, 
the brief historical outline presented above has to suffice. I will 
now comment on basic facts concerning languages in Spain.
B. A linguistic
panorama of Spain
The sociolinguistic panorama of contemporary Spain is highly 
complex. At the regional level, that is to say, in those autonomous 
communities having 'a language of their own' different from 
Castilian or Spanish proper, the situation is no less complex since 
each has its own characteristics and peculiarities. In what 
concerns the Catalan language, present for centuries in a large 
area along the north-eastern Mediterranean littoral and the 
Balearic Islands, the panorama is similarly intricate. Due
8 Juan J. Linz: 'Early state building...' op. cit.; 'Within-nation differences 
and comparisons: the case of Spain' (con A. de Miguel) in Richard L. 
Merrit, Stein Rokkan, eds. Comparing Nations. The use of 
quantitative data in cross-national research' New Haven, London: 
Yale University Press, 1966.
9 On this issue, see: Peter A. Gourevitch 'The reemergence of 
"peripheral nationalisms": Some comparative speculations on the 
spatial distribution of political leadership and economic growth' 




























































































primarily to sociological and demographical circumstances, the 
situation at the core of the Catalan-speaking area—that is, the 
Principat de Catalunya, whose historical boundaries correspond 
with those of the present autonomous community of Catalonia— 
is also complex. The heterogeneity of the sociolinguistic 
panorama—which has become more pronounced over recent 
decades due to social and geographical mobility—contrasts 
sharply with the pseudo historical simplifications so beloved of 
and useful to the ideologists of the various nationalist groups 
which compete for a larger share of power in the Iberian arena.
The aim of this paper is to highlight the complexities of the 
issue of language in Spain today, to describe in detail relevant 
empirical data, and to analyse the political implications of the 
matter. Indirectly, this would help in setting a framework for the 
evaluation of the significance of 'linguistic normalisation' and 
language planning policies implemented by certain regional 
autonomous administrations since their establishment. Attention 
will be focused at this stage on the case of Catalonia and on the 
policies adopted by the Generalitat de Catalunya government. 
Moreover, the overlapping of language planning with more 
general cultural and educational policies, will also be studied. 
Such policies—which might perhaps be labelled 'nation-building' 
policies—have been adopted over the last fifteen years or so by a 
number of regional governments in Spain in the context of a 
generalised 'devolution' process. To a certain extent, this paper 
could be taken as being a first contribution for a systematic 
evaluation of Juan J. Linz's work in the light of what has happened 
since he wrote it. I have more specifically in mind a long essay 
written in the threshold of the transition, at the end of which he 
made a set of projections, full of insight and discernment, 
concerning the issue of language in a future democratic Spain10.
10 Juan J. Linz 'Politics in a multilingual society with a dominant world 
language: the case of Spain' J.G. Savard; R. Vegneault, eds.




























































































Twenty years ago, Juan J. Linz bemoaned the lack of 
thorough empirical evidence on the issue of minority languages, 
which was all the more surprising bearing in mind its importance. 
Fortunately, this empirical lacuna has subsequently been 
remedied. The first available census data on minority languages is 
that derived from the questions on the use of Catalan that 
appeared in the 1975 mid-term census of municipalities in the 
province of Barcelona. In 1981 the census offices in the four 
Catalan provinces coordinated their efforts with those of the 
National Statistics Institute and produced Spain's first linguistic 
census properly speaking, which derived from a few questions 
made on the knowledge of the Catalan language. Five years later, 
the autonomous communities of Valencia, the Balearic Islands, the 
Basque Country and Navarre emulated the Catalan initiative, 
carrying out their own linguistic censuses on the knowledge of the 
vernaculars in their respective territories. In the last population 
census of 1991 the government of the Autonomous Community of 
Galicia also decided to include a number of questions about 
knowledge of the Galician language in its territory.
Since the data from the most recent censuses is not yet 
generally available, except in summaries, a full picture of Spain's 
linguistic panorama will have to be drawn using data from the 
1986 census and estimates where this is not available. The 
existence of an exhaustive report, commissioned by the European 
Commission and written by professor Miquel Siguan (which has 
subsequently been published in book form) spares me the task of
Multilingual Political Systems, problems and solutions Québec, Ca: Les 
Presses de l'Université Laval, 1975. In a more recent essay, the author 
approaches the same issues making use of new sociological data now 
available: J.J. Linz 'From Primordialism to Nationalism' in E.A. 
Tiryakian; R. Rogowski New Nationalisms o f the Developed West. 




























































































presenting all the relevant figures in detail. Instead, I shall 
summarise them 11.
In global figures, 41 percent of the Spanish population over 
the age of two lives in the six autonomous communities whose 
statutes of autonomy—in accordance with constitutional 
principles—are defined as having a 'language of their own' (i.e. 
where historically and currently, to a lesser or greater extent, a 
language other than Castilian—or Spanish—is spoken; the exact 
wording varies). In a region by region analysis, Miquel Siguan 
gives global data on the proportion of inhabitants who can be 
considered to be 'native speakers'—that is, who have as their 
'mother tongue'—the respective regional languages (these are 
estimates) and census data on the proportion of inhabitants who 
speak, read and write the same proficiently 12.
11 Miquel Siguan Linguistic minorities in the European Economic 
Community... op cit. Miquel Siguan La Espaha plurilingue Madrid: 
Alianza, 1992.
12 The fact that these terms are transcribed in brackets is to mark their 
equivocal character. They should not be taken as implying a value 
judgement or specific theoretical position concerning the 
sociolinguistic issues that revolve around them. On the contrary, the 
intention is to use them in a neutral way, eliminating as far as possible 
any misunderstanding of the technical or semantic issues involved. 
This is difficult to achieve since, in many cases, for example, 
individuals learn the two languages in parallel, the regional language 
and Castilian, perhaps one from each of the parents. Additionally, one 
must take into account other factors related to the ubiquitous presence 
of Castilian in these regions, more so in some than others. Areas 
where the vernacular is the sole spoken language are, in fact, very 
limited or non-existent, if we look at the last few decades. The most 
recent sociolinguistic surveys suggest that, in none of these regions, 
the percentage of individuals speaking only the vernacular is higher 
than 5 percent. This is the case even when the most stringent criteria 
are applied. Due to historico-political circumstances, the population of 
these regions are more proficient and literate in Castilian than they are 
in the respective regional language. The question to what extent and 
under what circumstances one or the other language is used 
complicates the issue considerably. Unfortunately, few properly
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In Galicia (where forecasts and estimates based on the 
census of 1985 are used, since no linguistic census proper was 
carried out that year) approximately 55 percent of the population 
has Galician as their first language or 'mother tongue'; although 
90 percent understand it and speak it with a reasonable degree of 
proficiency. 45 percent of the population have Castilian as the first 
or 'mother tongue'. The percentage of those who manifest they 
speak the language has raised to 91.4 percent in 199113.
Basque is not spoken throughout the entire territory of 
Navarre. The Ley Foral del Vascuence defines municipalities in the 
extreme north-west as 'Basque-speaking'; a number of 
municipalities around the city of Pamplona and in the extreme 
north-west as 'of mixed language'; and the southern half of the 
region (the most highly populated part), as well as the central 
eastern zone, as 'Castilian-speaking'. The waves of migration to 
the city from the farthest reaches of the region make of the capital 
city a specific case apart. Taking all these circumstances into 
account, only 10 percent of the region's population can be 
considered Basque-speaking. In Basque-speaking areas, the 
percentage of individuals who speak the language reaches 85 
percent, though. These figures have all been taken from census 
data. The percentage of those who know the language in the 
region overall, that is to say, those who can speak in Basque,
sociolinguistic surveys have been carried out so far. The void is, 
however, being filled. In 1993, the Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociologicas carried out a macrosurvey in each of the regions where a 
language other than Castilian is spoken. Data from this survey will be 
included and commented upon later on in this essay. For its part, the 
Basque government commissioned in 1991 a sophisticated and 
ambitious survey which covered the whole region on both sides of the 
Pyrenees where Basque has been traditionally spoken. Finally, the 
project sponsored by the Royal Galician Academy, the Sociolinguistic 
Map of Galicia project, merits mention; but it has not been finished 
yet.




























































































increases to 12-15 percent (depending on the level of proficiency 
required) 14. If one adds 'quasi euskera speakers' to these who are 
labelled as 'euskera speakers' the percentage raises to 16.4 
percent, in 1991 census figures 15.
Throughout the territory of the Basque autonomous 
community, which is not entirely Basque-speaking either, 20.5 
percent of the population 'speak Basque at home or are of Basque 
mother tongue' and 74 percent Castilian. Census data reveals that 
among the latter there are a considerable percentage of native 
Basques whose links with the region date back generations. In the 
region as a whole 25 percent are competent in the use of the 
Basque language. In contrast, 58 percent of the population have 
no knowledge whatsoever of Basque. This percentage has 
diminished to 53.9 percent in 1991 census figures 16. Although no 
census data is available on the knowledge of Castilian, the 
sociolinguistic surveys and other sources of empirical evidence 
show that this language is understood and spoken -with a greater 
or lesser degree of fluency- by practically the entire population 17.
Euskera (Basque) speakers—a language which is also 
spoken in some French municipalities on the other side of the
14 Miquel Siguân La Espana plurilingüe... apendix, maps pag. 340. For 
greater detail, consult the official publications of the Government of 
Navarre, for example: Distribution de la poblaciôn de Navarra segûn 
el nivel de Euskara (Padrones Municipales de Habitantes, 1986) 
Pamplona, 1988.
15 Gobierno de Navarra. Summary of the 1991 Census.
16 EUSTAT (Instituto Vasco de Estadistica). Summary of the 1991 census.
17 Basic sources on this are: Miquel Siguân La Espana plurilingüe... 
apendix, maps, pag. 331, 332. Mapa Sotiolingüîstico de la Comunidad 
Autônoma Vasca derivado del Padrôn de 1986 V itoria-Gasteiz, 
Servicio Central de Publicaciones del Gobierno Vasco, 1989, maps 
throughout the book. Joseba Intxausti Euskera, la lengua de los vascos 
Donostia: Elkar/Gobierno Vasco, 1991. On the comparative knowledge 
of Castilian and the regional language, the best source is probably the 
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Pyrenees—have to deal with the considerable handicap presented 
by the dialectical variations of their language. Certain dialects 
differ so much from each other that native inhabitants of 
neighbouring valleys can sometimes barely understand each other 
when using them. There is also the problem of the intrinsic 
difficulty of the Basque language for those who do not have it as 
their mother tongue, since it does not belong to the Indo-European 
family of languages. As is the case in Galicia, the grammar, 
vocabulary and syntax of Euskera is yet to be fully standardised. In 
both these autonomous communities, this technical issue carries 
certain political overtones; the same is true for Valencia, but for 
different reasons.
Catalan is spoken, in its various dialectical forms, in three 
different autonomous communities: Catalonia, Valencia and the 
Balearic Islands. A narrow strip of territory belonging to the 
neighbouring autonomous community of Aragon is also Catalan 
speaking. Equally, Catalan has been spoken in the regions 
bordering Catalonia on the other side of the Pyrenees (mostly in 
the southern part of the Roussillon region) and—in a slightly 
archaic form—in the town of Alguer, Sardinia, due to the fact that 
a large Catalan colony settled in the town in the 14th century. In a 
small municipality of the Catalan Pyrenees, the Val d'Aran, a 
language or dialect of Gascon origin is spoken 18.
In the Balearic Islands, it is estimated that 64 percent of the 
population can be considered 'Catalan speakers'. The percentage 
of those who are competent in the use of Catalan is higher. In the 
1986 census 70.8 percent declare that they speak the regional 
language; surprisingly, five years later this percentage has
18 For the first time a linguistic census of this local language was made in 
1991, applying the same methodology as for the Catalan language 
census. See: Cens de Poblacio 1991. Vol. 8 Cens Linguistic. Dades 
comarcals i municipals Generalitat de Catalunya, Institut d'Estadfstica 
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lowered to 66.7 percent 19. It might be due in part to the 
establishment of new residents from foreign countries in the 
islands. Only 9.9 percent, in 1991 figures, most of them recent 
immigrants from other parts of the Peninsula or foreigners, do not 
understand Catalan at all.
In the autonomous community of the Pais Valencia, where 
Catalan is not spoken uniformly throughout all its territory, it is 
estimated that 40 percent of the population speak Catalan 'at 
home or as their mother tongue'. Census data shows that 49.5 
percent of individuals in 1986 say that they are competent speakers 
of Catalan and 22.9 percent state that they do not understand it. In 
1992 survey figures a substantial improvement in the knowledge 
of the regional language shows: 60.5 percent declare they speak it, 
and only 15.5 percent say they do not understand i t 20. Once again, 
it is implicit that, both in the Balearic Islands and in Valencia, 
those whose first language or mother tongue is not Catalan have 
Castilian as their first or family language, and that practically 
everybody understands and speaks Castilian, regardless of their 
knowledge of the regional language.
The complexities of the sociolinguistic panorama in 
Catalonia can be largely attributed to demographic and migratory 
factors, i.e. the fact that about 50 percent of the population is not 
native to the region but rather consists of first or second 
generation immigrants who are Castilian speaking peoples. 
According to Miquel Siguan's estimates, in 1986, 51 percent of 
Catalonia's inhabitants were of Catalan mother tongue. At that 
time only 9.5 percent of the population did not understand 
Catalan, though.
A very positive factor in Catalonia has been the capacity 
demonstrated by an important proportion of non-native people
19 Govern Balear. 1991 linguistic census.
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recently settled in the region to progressively assimilate the 
Catalan language. The extraordinary advances made in the 
knowledge of the Catalan language over the last decades is proof 
of this; even if we allow that these figures also reflect the 
enormous effort made on the part of the autonomous institutions 
to implement 'linguistic normalisation' policies since 1980. Data 
from the last population census in 1991 confirms the tendency of 
Catalan to regain ground, particularly among young people. This 
is doubtlessly more directly linked to the progressive introduction 
of Catalan in the classroom—both as vehicular language and as 
second language—at various levels of the educational system. 
Although this circumstances only date back to the beginning of the 
1980's, when administrative control over educational and cultural 
matters in the region was 'devolved' to the Generalitat 
government 21.
The figures so far commented upon serve to give a broad 
outline of Spain's sociolinguistic panorama, which was identified 
as complex in the first paragraphs of this chapter. It is certainly 
not sufficient to explain away the situation in terms of certain
21 In the foreword to the book quoted in the last footnote, the director of 
the Statistical Institute of Catalonia summarises the dimensions of 
this increase over the past five years: '93.8 percent of the population 
has declared that they understand Catalan... thus, the fraction of the 
population who do not understand Catalan has diminished to 6.2 
percent from 9.4 percent in 1986. What is more, 68.3 percent of the 
population can speak Catalan, a four percent increase since 1986 when 
this figure stood at 64.2 percent. Particularly noteworthy are 
developments in the province of Barcelona (where the Castilian 
spreaking population is concentrated), where there has been a five 
percent increase, higher than the Catalan average. The categories most 
indicative of literacy, such as 'know how to read' and 'know how to 
write' have shown considerable increases over the last five years and 
reflect the impact of schooling in Catalan, especially among young 
people. 67.6 percent of the population now know how to read Catalan 
as compared to 60.7 percent in 1986. As regards the percentage of those 
who know how to write in Catalan, this stood at 31.6 percent five years 
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supposedly linguistically homogeneous regions with a language of 
their own sitting on the periphery, in contrast with a Castilian­
speaking 'rest of Spain' which would be similarly homogeneous, 
linguistically speaking. This being the case, Spain could be likened 
to Belgium or Switzerland in this respect; but it should be clear by 
now that the situation is not quite the same. Important 
complexities exist at the level of each region, each case having its 
own peculiarities and specific circumstances. Thus, the linguistic 
'problem' of Spain, or of any of the nationalities and regions it 
encompasses for that matter, cannot be resolved by applying 
simple political or technical formulas and remedies. Evoking the 
examples of other countries within Europe or elsewhere in favour 
of one solution or another can do more harm than good if this is 
not accompanied by an in-depth knowledge of the specificities of 
each case.
C. Language and Collective 
Identities in Catalonia
In Catalonia, language is a key element in the construction of 
collective identities and boundary delimitation. In the complicated 
demolinguistic circumstances described in the previous chapter— 
perhaps precisely as a result of this—the regional language has 
become the most potent symbol of Catalan identity, and 
doubtlessly the most emotion-charged one. No wonder it has been 
converted into a fundamental tool for the mobilisation of 
primordial loyalties and political will. However, as is the case 
with all dominant and primary symbols, it operates as much at an 
implicit as an explicit level, as we will see further on.
What most calls the attention of the lay observer, as well as 
professionals of sociolinguistics, is the seemingly paradoxical fact 
that, despite its status as a minority language, excluded from 
public administration, totally banished from the educational 
system during the decades of Francoism, it has not only emerged 
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Catalonia at least) with a higher social status than Castilian, its 
historical competitor, one of the most widely-spoken languages in 
the world and the dominant language in Spain 22. The citizens of 
Catalonia in general, including a majority of non-autochtonous 
residents, have been shown to have a very positive attitude 
towards the Catalan language. This might be a crucial factor in 
accounting for the rapid progress made in its knowledge and use 
since 1975, the year for which the first reliable figures are 
available on the situation the language in the Principality 23.
It must be underlined, however, that data derived from the 
various Spanish regional linguistic censuses refer exclusively to 
knowledge of the vernacular languages (Catalan, in this case), 
and not to the patterns of its use nor to the rules of adaptation or 
seams of conflict apparent in its interaction with Castilian. In such 
a strongly bilingual context as that of Catalonia, the above factors 
are nevertheless of crucial importance. Thus, in order to grasp 
their meaning and evaluate the practical consequences, we must 
make recourse to other investigative methods and different 
sources of empirical evidence, such as sociological and 
sociolinguistic surveys.
In 1983, I personally carried out a survey which covered 
sociolinguistic and other issues pertaining to collective identities 
and intergroup stereotypes in an area of Catalonia which all 
indicators show to be the most 'catalanised' from an
22 See, for example, Kathryn A. Woolard Double Talk. Bilingualism and 
the Politics of Ethnicity in Catalonia Stanford, Ca: Stanford University 
Press, 1989; Charlotte Hoffman An Introduction to Bilingualism 
London: Longman, 1991, chap. 13.
23 In addition to the sources mentioned above, see:Jude Webber, Miquel 
Strubell i Trueta The Catalan Language. Progress Towards 
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ethnolinguistic point of view 24. Further on, I will comment on 
some data on the knowledge of, patterns of use of, and attitudes 
towards the Catalan language derived from this survey. The 
advantage of a survey is that it allows one to work with complex 
variables, generally not available in census databases, in order to 
attain a well balanced understanding of the prevailing 
circumstances in each case, such as the variable 'ethnolinguistic 
identity of the interviewee'. In addition, there are many other 
basic variables such as sex, age, level of formal education, the 
origin of the parents, or the political affiliation of the interviewee 
which can also be taken into account. The limitation of surveys is 
that they treat only a sample of the population, instead of the 
entire population, as is the case with censuses. As a result, data 
derived from sociological surveys cannot be used in analyses of 
geographical distribution of characteristics or phenomena; 
additionally, there is the fact that surveys rely to a greater extent 
on the mere opinion of the interviewee than do censuses.
I shall start with a brief commentary on data pertaining to 
knowledge of the vernacular in the area studied in the above 
mentioned survey. Practically all the interviewees classed as 
autochthonous—that is to say, those whose parents were born in 
Catalonia and whose mother tongue is generally Catalan—speak 
the vernacular with no difficulty. However, not all of these are 
able to read in the language so easily, and only 32.3 percent know 
how to write in it. At the root of this high rate of illiteracy in the 
mother tongue—a personal hindrance as well as a strong cause of 
grievance against the persons and institutions perceived to be or 
have been responsible for such a serious anomaly—is doubtlessly 
the imposition of Castilian as the sole language of instruction at
24 The area of the survey includes the seven counties of the province of 
Girona, plus the counties of El Solsones and La Segarra in the 
province of Lleida. See: Andres Barrera-Gonzalez La dialectica de la 
identidad en Cataluna Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, 
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all levels of the educational system during the Francoist 
dictatorship (1939-1975).
The data pertaining to the interviewees classed as non- 
autochtonous—first or second generation immigrants, whose 
mother tongue is Castilian or Spanish—surely contrasts with that 
of the autochthonous interviewees, although not to the extent that 
one might have expected. Thus, 88.7 percent of individuals classed 
as non-autochtonous for the purposes of this area study stated 
that they understood spoken Catalan; what is more, 45.2 percent 
held that they could express themselves in this language, 37.7 
percent that they could read it and finally 8.4 percent that they 
could even write in it. This data confirms the findings from census 
sources that highlight the existence of a remarkable process of 
linguistic integration on the part of immigrants. This has occurred 
despite very unfavourable circumstances, namely, the type of 
educational system which prevailed in Spain until 1978, as well as 
the socioeconomic conditions and settlement patterns affecting the 
immigrant population, particularly in the metropolitan area of 
Barcelona 25.
25 Catalonia is one of the most industrialised regions of Spain, which 
underwent a small-scale and specific 'industrial revolution' in the 
19th century, in contrast to the rest of Spain, with perhaps the 
exception of the Basque Country. Since the end of the 19th century 
industrial and economic growth have attracted contingents of 
immigrant workers. Thus, between 1950 and 1975, a total of 1.393.000 
people from other Spanish regions settled in Catalonia. For the most 
part, these were individuals with low or no professional qualifications 
who found employment in the manufacturing industries.
For its part, the autochtonous population, at least during the second 
half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, had a very low 
fertility rate. In consequence, the growth of the economy, particularly 
during the boom years, depended heavily on an influx of immigrants 
from outside the region. The demographer Anna Cabré considers that 
the low fertility rate among the autochtonous population, along with 
the massive influx of immigrants, are characteristics of what she terms 
'the Modern Catalan System of Reproduction' (See: Anna Cabré Les



























































































- 2 7 -
Data from the 1983 survey shows that the linguistic 
assimilation of immigrants is relatively more favoured at the level 
of the local community than the neighbourhood (neighbours tend
generations catalanes, 1870-1970 Unpublished doctoral thesis, 
Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 198?). However, according to this 
author, the most striking and peculiar aspect of the 'Catalan System of 
Reproduction' is the way in which these waves of immigrants have 
been assimilated not only from a sociodemographical, but also from a 
cultural point of view, despite Catalonia's status as a minoritary and 
peripheral culture, and a regional entity which had been subordinated 
in a nation state in which it did not play a politically dominant role, 
that is, a polity lacking political and institutional instruments which 
could be put to use to achieve these ends.
Other less optimistic authors, of a less tolerant disposition, viewing 
the situation from a perspective which is more strongly nationalist, 
even 'ethnicist' (or racist), draw very different conclusions from the 
same facts. They see in the low fertility rate of the autochtonous 
population, combined with extraregional mass immigration, a serious 
threat to the permanence of the Catalan etnos. One of the most 
characteristic propounders of this argument is Josep A. Vandellos in 
his book Catalunya, poble decadent Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1985 (1935), 
who was director of the Statistical Service of the Generalitat de 
Catalunya during the Second Republic.
In an obvious, oblique reference to the thesis of J.A. Vandellos, Anna 
Cabre concludes her demographic analysis of the Catalan cohorts with 
thought-provoking commentaries, in her characteristic witty and 
vitalist tone: 'We were not decadent, we were a people who had found 
a particular way of doing things, which had demographic 
implications'. This particular way of doing things in Catalonia 
consisted in making recourse to 'adoption' instead of 'natural 
reproduction' to meet the demands of demographic growth. The 
'problem of immigration' crops up continually in the discourse, 
frequently implicitly rather that explicitly, of nationalist circles. This is 
understandable in the light of its great political significance. By way of 
illustration, see: J.M. Ainaud et al Immigracid i reconstruccio national 
a Catalunya Barcelona: Fundacio Jaume Bofill/Editorial Blume, 1980; 
or the book written by the current President of the Generalitat, which 
carries an evocative title: Jordi Pujol La immigracid, problema i 
esperanqa de Catalunya Barcelona: Nova Terra, 1976. Also: Marc A. 
Vila Les migrations i Catalunya Barcelona: El Llamp, 1984. Carlota 
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to be recent immigrants like themselves), and at the level of the 
neighbourhood more than in the family. At the time, the workplace 
was not a locus  that facilitated immigrants' linguistic 
incorporation. A point of great importance would be to analyse 
what happens in the case of families of ethnolinguistically mixed 
couples. This extremely interesting question has yet to be studied 
in sufficient depth and detail, although instruments already exist 
that would permit such a research endeavour.
Ten years later, in 1993, a similar survey to the one described 
above, applied by the Centre for Sociological Studies (CIS'93) to a 
representative sample of the population of the whole Catalan 
region yielded the results which I will now summarise. 99.5 
percent of the interviewees were competent in spoken Castilian; 
while those competent in spoken Catalan were less, 73.7 percent. 
The discrepancy is more marked in what concerns ability to write 
in these languages: 93.3 percent state that they are able to write in 
Castilian, whereas only 40.5 percent are capable of writing in 
Catalan. Cross-tabulation with the variable 'mother tongue of the 
interviewee, or language spoken at home when a child' allows for 
a better informed analysis of the data 26.
26 With regard to what concerns us here, the 'mother tongue or language 
spoken at home' variable is of crucial importance. I shall therefore 
describe the different values assigned to it. The langfatni variable has 
four values or basic categories: 'O ' Interviewees that just understand 
Catalan (22.1 percent of the sample) or who don't even understand it 
(an additional 4.1 percent); 'A' Interviewees who state that Catalan is 
their mother tongue or the language spoken at home ('the language 
that was spoken at home during your childhood'), or Catalan speakers 
for our purposes (40.1 percent of the sample). 'B ' Interviewees that 
state that their mother tongue or the language spoken at home when 
they were children was Castilian, or Castilian speakers, who are 
nevertheless competent speakers of Catalan (27.8 percent of the 
sample). 'C ' Interviewees who state that their mother tongue or the 
language spoken at home was both Castilian and Catalan, or bilinguals 
in the strict sense of the term, and most of whom were born in 
Catalonia to 'mixed' couples (4.6 percent of the sample). Lastly, a
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Perhaps the most significant information that can be drawn 
from cross-tabulation analysis at this stage is that which refers to 
the interviewees in category 'B' (individuals whose mother tongue 
is Castilian but who also speak Catalan): 78 percent of these are 
also able to read in Catalan, and 40 percent are able to write in it. 
This data shows that, effectively, knowledge of Catalan is making 
progresses among the non-autochtonous inhabitants of the 
region. In this respect, the data which I will now mention is more 
conclusive and significant, since it shows changes in individuals' 
linguistic identity (as accounted for by self-perception) clearly in 
favour of the Catalan ethnos: 25 percent of those in category 'B' 
and 86 percent of those in category ‘C  (see, footnote #26) 
identified themselves—notwithstanding their mother tongue 
being Castilian—as 'more Catalan speakers than Castilian 
speakers'. In contrast, only 3 percent of category 'A' interviewees 
(individuals who had Catalan as the first or mother tongue) now 
perceive themselves to be 'more Castilian than Catalan speakers'.
Needless to say, the progression pointed out is gradual and 
slow, which does not satisfy those who look at it from narrow 
nationalistic perspectives. Professionals of sociolinguistics, 
however, take this type of evidence as a very positive indicator 
and one that is quite surprising—given the prevalent 
circumstances—since changes in language use have to be 
measured in terms of the pass of generations, rather that in 
calendar years or decades. But who among the politicians, what 
partisan political organisation, is prepared to let one or two 
generations pass before harvesting the electoral fruits of their 
labour?
Data from the 1983 survey relating to the everyday use of 
Catalan brings to light some serious anomalies or incongruences.
remaining 1.1 percent have a mother tongue other than Castilian or 
Catalan, but these will not be taken into account due to the lack of 
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The mother tongue of 96 percent of the interviewees classed as 
autochthonous was Catalan; and this was the language mainly 
used by them in everyday spoken communication. (It is important 
to bear in mind that circumstances are generally favourable in the 
area where this particular survey was carried out, in sharp 
contrast with the metropolitan area of Barcelona, which was not 
included). However, only 14.3 percent of them had attended 
primary schools where the main spoken language in the classroom 
was effectively Catalan, although even in these schools the text 
books were mostly in Castilian. A small minority, 1.7 percent of the 
sample, had been privileged enough to attend primary schools 
where Catalan was the language of instruction. These last were 
schools run by the Generalitat during the Second Republic or 
private institutions during the second phase of Francoism when 
repressive measures were slackened and Catalan came to be 
somehow tolerated in the public sphere.
Despite adverse circumstances—in particular, the 
imposition of a Castilianised, repressive and absurd educational 
system throughout Spain, all the more absurd for those with a 
mother tongue other than Castilian—by 1983 a number of 
individuals had overcome, by dint of their own effort, the anomaly 
of an enforced illiteracy in their own language. At that time, 13.9 
percent of the interviewees in the area of reference stated that 
they read in Catalan more frequently than in Castilian; 45.9 
percent said that they used the two languages indistinctly; and 
39.8 percent that they mainly used Castilian. As regards to 
writing, 34.4 percent of the autochthonous individuals said that 
they used Catalan rather than Castilian (personal letters, notes... 
i.e. a very limited use for the majority of them); 17.7 percent used 
both languages indistinctly; and 45.9 percent Castilian exclusively.
Concerning the patterns of everyday use of both languages, 
the CIS'93 survey is an abundant and very rich source of 
information, since it is intended precisely for the study of these 
sort of issues, which in a truly bilingual context such as Catalonia 
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time nor place to comment in detail on such data. I would like only 
to make some very general observations about it. When looking at 
the tables, one is first struck by the fluid nature of the current 
situation in Catalonia. It is one which is open, and tremendously 
complicated. In this fluid and complex setting, Catalan is clearly 
gaining ground in all areas despite, as I mentioned before, the 
rather unfavourable de facto circumstances still prevailing. As 
regards to communication within the family, as is to be expected, 
there is a great degree of fixedness. A similar pattern is revealed 
in the case of married couples, although it is slightly more fluid. 
But if we turn to differences between generations, the findings are 
more interesting and significant. A considerable strengthening of 
Catalan is apparent if we look at the language spoken by the 
offspring of interviewees among themselves. Thus, for example, 
36 percent of children of couples formed by individuals classed in 
category 'B' speak primarily Catalan to each other. A similar but 
less marked pattern is apparent in what concerns the language 
used by parents classed in category 'B' and, to a greater extent, 
those classed in category 'C' (mixed marriages), in their 
interactions with their children.
The opinions and manifest attitudes of the interviewees 
point to a potential inversion of the prevalent anomalous usage 
patterns concerning the two languages present in Catalonia, in 
the not too distant future; particularly if one takes into account the 
political and educational changes which were only beginning to 
take shape at the time when the first survey was carried out 27. 1 
am referring to the introduction of Catalan as the vehicular 
language in primary schools and its present high profile in the 
mass media. An overwhelming majority of autochthonous 
Catalans of the area studied in 1983 were in favour of mainly 
using Catalan in schools. Additionally, the interviewees stated
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that they would prefer (an extraordinary testimony to their 
personal commitment and political determination) to read and 
write in Catalan, to a greater extent than they in fact did and— 
doubtlessly—to an extent over and above their actual capabilities 
at the time.
As regards the public use of the two languages present in 
Catalonia, those interviewed in 1983 were also strongly in favour 
of the recatalanization of public life; be it by means of proposals 
for the exclusive use of Catalan in certain spheres or for a parity 
between Catalan and Castilian. On this point, the contrast in the 
opinions of the autochthonous and non-autochtonous is 
significant. A large majority of the former were in favour of 
mainly or exclusively using Catalan in the hypothetical 
circumstances put forward to them in the survey (and more 
specifically, an overwhelming majority wanted Catalan to be used 
for street names). Nevertheless, a considerable proportion were of 
the opinion that both languages should be used indistinctly, above 
all in the case of official documents (43.2 percent) and 
advertisements (36.1 percent). In contrast, a majority of non- 
autochtonous believed that both languages should be used 
indistinctly in all the suggested circumstances; except in the case of 
street names!: 56.6 percent of them felt that these should be in 
Catalan exclusively 28.
Judging by my own personal experience during fieldwork, I 
would say that people are, in fact, much more accommodating in 
the day-to-day interactive use of the two languages than what 
their replies to the questionnaire might suggest. This leads one to 
ponder on the limitations and artificiality of the survey as an 
instrument of research. What these opinions do express, though, is 
a strong desire for events to take a more 'natural' turn in the near
28 Data is taken form the survey carried out by myself in 1983, which is 
presented in detail and extensively commented upon in: Andres 
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future, in order to restore their dignity as Catalans, speakers of a 
neglected language. As has been the case with so many other 
issues in Catalonia's recent history, an acute conflict exists 
between desire and reality. Catalans have long been tormented by 
radical Hamletian dilemmas (Catalunya infelix, was the title of a 
treatise whose author I no longer remember); and this affects the 
common citizen with a certain level of political consciousness as 
much as it does elites 29. The radicalisation of public opinion and 
the intensification of conflict over the question of language, along 
with other issues related to the longed-for political and cultural 
'reconstruction' of Catalonia, is partly due to the dissemination of 
propaganda from the fora and new democratic institutions in 
which—even at the time when the first survey was carried out— 
nationalist ideologies already prevailed 30. Continuous prejudice 
against Catalonia and all things Catalan, ignorance and 
misunderstanding, and propagandistic attacks on the part of 
certain sectors of the media and the political class from elsewhere 
in Spain accounts for another good part of the responsibility in 
this intensification of conflict31.
29 This conflict is expressed in even more dramatic tones, for example, 
when more radical issues, which touch upon the future of Catalonia 
as a 'nation' are discussed. See: A. Estradé, M. Treserra Catalunya 
Independent? Anàlisi d'una enquesta sobre la identitat nacional i la 
voluntat d'independència dels Catalans Barcelona: Fundació Jaume 
Bofill, 1990, in particular chapters 3 and 4.
30 Convergencia i Unió, the nationalist coalition led by Jordi Pujol, won 
a majority in the first autonomous elections held in 1980, after the 
Statute of Autonomy was passed. In subsequent elections, including 
the last ones held in 1992, Convergencia won by absolute majorities.
31 Ethnolinguistic conflict concerning Catalonia and the language issue 
has reached ever high levels in Spain since mid 1993, when the 
nationalists in office in the Generalitat decided to give their support to 
the minority socialist government in Madrid, thus opening a new 
phase in the relations between centre and periphery in Spanish 
politics, which carried with it profound political and constitutional 
implications. Extraneous elements which cropped up later on— 
serious charges of corruption and political scandals of all sorts, which
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As regards opinions and preferences, I will now comment on 
some additional data, this time taken from the CIS'93 survey. Ten 
years after the first survey was carried out, there are two new 
factors in the Catalan arena which have to be taken into account. 
The first is the introduction of Catalan as language of instruction 
at all levels of education, and principally in primary and secondary 
schools, following the 'devolution' of administrative competence 
in this domain to the Generalitat. The second is the existence of 
two television channels which broadcast exclusively in Catalan: 
TV3 since 1984 and Canal 33 since 1988. Both are publicly owned 
and administered by the Generalitat. Thus, there is abundant 
availability of television programmes in both languages, although 
perhaps not a wholly balanced one in terms of broadcasting 
hours 32.
Interviewees showed the following preferences. Those 
classed in category 'O' prefer to watch TV either in Castilian (61 
percent) or in both languages indistinctly (36.5 percent). 
Interviewees in category 'A' prefer viewing TV in their own 
language, Catalan (60.5 percent), or in both languages indistinctly 
(32 percent). Interviewees in category 'B' state that they watch 
programmes irrespective of the language in which they are 
broadcast (62.2 percent), others (22.5 percent) prefer to view in 
Castilian and 15.1 percent in Catalan. Category 'C' interviewees
were used by the opposition parties for launching sweeping and 
relentless attacks on the socialists and its Catalan 'accomplices'—has 
considerably muddled, to worrying extremes, the political atmosphere.
32 In any case, broadcasts in Catalan and in Castilian, taken globally, have 
an approximately balanced following, as has been shown by numerous 
audience studies carried out in recent years. Since 1994 there is a new 
important actor in the media scene: the municipal administration of 
the city of Barcelona—under the continuous control of the Catalan 
socialists—have decided to launch its own municipal-metropolitan 
owned TV channel: Barcelona Televisio. This has been interpreted by 
some as a challenge to the nationalists virtual monopoly of TV 
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are roughly divided down the middle between preferences for 
programmes 'in Catalan' (47.8 percent) and 'in either language' 
(45.6 percent). The market, as well as viewers preferences, are 
nearly evenly divided between the vernacular and Castilian.
On a level which reflects more personal commitment and a 
certain potential for division 'along ethnic lines', interviewees 
revealed the following preferences with respect to choice of 
friends. 34 percent of individuals classed in category 'O' prefer to 
socialise with people who speak the same language as themselves; 
the same was true of 33.5 percent in category 'A' and 10.5 percent 
in category 'B'. In category 'C', 28 percent prefer friends who 
speak Catalan and 6.5 percent those who speak Castilian. 
However, the most predominant attitude is one of openness and 
tolerance, interviewees refuse to take the ethnolinguistic label into 
account when choosing their friends. Individuals classed in 
category 'B' are most emphatic in their refusal to take this factor 
into account (81.5 percent), roughly 65 percent of individuals from 
each of the other categories also feels the same way.
Interviewees' opinions on the use of the two languages 
present in the area in schools are of particular relevance at the 
moment, given the current controversy surrounding the issue and 
its intrinsic importance. 86 percent of individuals classed in 
category 'A', 68 percent of those in category 'B' and 88.5 percent in 
category 'C' (less important in quantitative terms), in other words, 
the vast majority of interviewees, are in favour of a primary 
school system where Catalan is the vehicular language. This is 
taken to mean primary schools where classes are given in Catalan 
and in which Castilian would have no more than a 
complementary status, either as an obligatory or a voluntary 
subject. Category 'O' is the only one where a majority (62.5 
percent) are in favour of schools using Castilian in the classroom, 
rather than Catalan (37.5 percent). The same opinion is shared by 
12.5 percent of individuals in category 'A', 32.5 percent of those in 
category 'B' and 11.5 percent in category 'C'. The public consensus 
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school education should be in Catalan, the regional language. 
However, this should not be allowed to obscure the proportions of 
people from the various categories who want their children to be 
taught in Castilian, especially so in the light of the direct 
implications of this issue as concerns fundamental rights of the 
individual, and in this case, paradoxically, the rights of a minority 
within a minority.
The above-mentioned consensus on the topic of school 
education is not so apparent in replies to the question: 'If you had 
to go to an official body in order to attend to some business, in 
which language would you prefer to be addressed, Castilian or 
Catalan?'. A majority of interviewees in category 'A' (73 percent) 
and 'C' (58.5 percent) preferred Catalan. On the contrary, 
Castilian was the preferred option for individuals in category 'O' 
(80 percent). Category 'B' individuals did not perceive the 
language of the bureaucracy as a problem, and the majority of 
them (56.5 percent) replied 'I don't mind'. Considerable 
proportions of interviewees in categories 'A' and 'C' adopt the 
same attitude of indifference or coldness towards an equally cold 
bureaucracy. What is evident is that there is little open support for 
Castilian in this domain (with the exception of the above- 
mentioned category 'O' interviewees): only 25 percent in category 
'B', 4.5 percent in category 'C' and 4 percent in category 'A' would 
prefer to be addressed in Castilian in a bureaucratic context. 
Unlike the vernacular, Castilian does not arouse great emotion or 
loyal enthusiasm, despite its still ubiquitous presence in the region. 
Once again, this provokes reflection on the chasms between 
reality and desire in Catalonia, the force of practical 
circumstances and personal and collective will-power orientated 
to the future.
Language doubtlessly plays an extremely important role in 
the shaping of Catalan identity. However, when the interviewees 
are asked the question (so befitting of the artificiality of 
sociological surveys!) 'Who is Catalan?'—in other words, what 



























































































- 3 7 -
Catalan—language surprisingly slips into second place. When the 
interviewees are placed in this particular scenario, other factors 
come into the forefront. We will now look at their replies, in some 
detail, firstly from the 1983 survey. When asked in the form of an 
open-ended question, 29.4 percent of the autochthonous 
individuals firstly answered 'those born in the region'; plus an 
additional 2.8 percent of them who mentioned this in second place. 
However, if we look at the total number of times each factor was 
mentioned—two were taken into account, the two that were 
mentioned or that were most emphasised by the interviewee in his 
'open' answer to the question—a purely subjective or voluntaristic 
factor, rather than birthplace, heads the list: 'whoever feels 
Catalan, whoever wants to be' (42.1 percent of times mentioned). 
The other factors mentioned frequently were the following: 'those 
who value Catalonia and all things Catalan' (28.8 percent) and 
'those who speak Catalan' (28.3 percent).
In contrast, the non-autochtonous individuals emphasised 
the following factors, in order of importance: 'those who were 
born in Catalonia' (56.3 percent), 'whoever feels and wants to be 
Catalan' (33.1 percent), 'anyone who lives and works in 
Catalonia' (20.6 percent) and 'those who value Catalonia and all 
things Catalan' (21.3 percent). Only 16.5 percent of non- 
autochtonous individuals mention the need to speak Catalan. In a 
global comparison of the replies of autochthonous inhabitants and 
immigrants, one notes that while the former dwell upon the 
individual's will and the sentiments of the person, and only 
mention birthplace in second place, the latter reverse the order of 
priority of these two factors. On the other hand, the 
autochthonous individuals in the sample consider it quite 
important, though not essential, that the person speaks the 
vernacular; while the immigrants do not put so much emphasis on 
this point, stressing instead a factor related directly to their own 
situation, namely 'to live and work in Catalonia'.
In another question, closed-ended this time, the interviewees 
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attributed to ten preselected factors (which approximately 
corresponded with those mentioned 'spontaneously' by them in 
the preceding open-ended question) in relation to a hypothetical 
claim to 'catalanness'. At this point in the interview, the 
autochthonous individuals discreetly relegate to sixth place the 
birthplace factor; in other words, this is not of decisive importance 
to them. Instead, they once more lay emphasis on factors related 
to the individuals' will, and their actions which are proof of that 
will, to be accepted as Catalan ('all those who want to be 
considered Catalan and who behave accordingly should be so 
considered'). They also stress, if to a lesser extent, the need for the 
person to speak Catalan, as well as a rather passive and ill- 
defined requisite 'that the person adapts to Catalan customs'.
Not such a sharp contrast is apparent in the non- 
autochtonous individuals' replies to this last question. This group 
places similar emphasis, if moderately, on the following factors: 
'to value all things Catalan', 'to wish to be Catalan', 'to defend all 
things Catalan', 'to have been born in the region' and 'to adapt to 
local customs'. The factor, which one may consider as rather 
circumstantial, of 'living and working in Catalonia' is to the 
immigrants equally important or more so than the ability to speak 
the regional language, although they do not place strong 
emphasis on either of these two factors.
Turning to the two questions in which the interviewee was 
asked to express an opinion about the constituent elements of the 
Catalan ethnos, it would be perhaps most interesting to see to 
what extent variables such as age, level of formal education and 
political affiliation influence the replies given. The age variable 
has a considerable influence on the global demands made by that 
person. The older the interviewee is, the more demanding he or 
she is when faced with a hypothetical claimant to 'catalanness'. 
On this point, we should take into account the way in which 
replies are influenced by the the lack of 'resonance of relevance' to 
interviewees of certain rather abstract and artificial questions; in 
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diminishes with age—which also has a bearing on the answers 
given. In general, the younger interviewees evidently grasp the 
'meaning' of questions better, as well as the expectations of the 
interviewer! They are also more discriminating in the scoring 
questions, a more significant and marked grading is apparent in 
their replies. For the younger interviewees, being Catalan has 
more to do with the individual's will, sentiment and a behaviour 
which might be taken as testimony to it. In contrast, the older 
interviewees, although they also emphasise these factors, place 
more stress on requisites over which the hypothetical claimant to 
'catalanness' has no control: 'to have been born in Catalonia', 'to 
be born to a Catalan family, to have Catalan forefathers', 'to have 
Catalan as mother tongue'. The replies of the middle-aged 
interviewees are similar to those of the young interviewees, if a 
little less clearly defined.
The level of education variable has a similar but not identical 
effect to that of age. Thus, for example, the global exigency of 
interviewees vis a vis the hypothetical claimant to 'catalanness' 
increases with level of education, as it does with age, although it 
does so for different reasons. Thus, while those with the highest 
level of formal education prioritise the subjective factor 'to want 
to be Catalan and become assimilated', and minimise the 
importance of having 'Catalan parents or grandparents', the 
interviewees with the lowest level of formal education stressed 
the subjective notion 'to value all things Catalan', and thought 
that voting or not voting for 'Catalan' (that is, nationalist) 
political parties was unimportant. As the level of formal education 
of individuals increases, there is a marked decrease in the 
importance attributed to factors over which the claimant has no 
control, such as birthplace and autochthonous ancestry. The 
comment made concerning 'resonance of relevance' and mere 
intelligibility of the question posed, depending on age, also applies 
to the level of formal education variable: those with a higher level 
of formal education are more discriminating than those with less 
formal education, although they express this in a less radical way 
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younger interviewees are generally also more educated, and they 
therefore manifest in their answers the combined effect of the two 
variables.
If we look at the voting preference or political affiliation
variable, one observes that those who vote for parties perceived 
as being more Catalanist or nationalist are more demanding with 
respect to the requisites: 'to speak Catalan', 'to want to be Catalan, 
to become assimilated', 'to adapt to Catalan customs' and 'to 
value all things Catalan'. Supporters of parties with less 
pronounced nationalist leanings place more emphasis on the 
factors outside the candidate's control, such as 'to have been born 
in Catalonia' or 'to have Catalan parents or grandparents'. As 
one would expect, the national self-identification variable exerts 
similar influence to that of voting preference, since there obviously 
exists a previous strong correlation between the two. Overall, the 
observed congruence between self-identification and voting 
preferences and level of ethnic demand is quite significant. The 
political-ideological factor is shown to be of decisive importance is 
determining ethnic attitudes.
The replies to an analogous question in the CIS'93 survey 
are in agreement with those to the 1983 survey 33. Perhaps one of 
the most significant things revealed in the answers to this question 
in the CIS'93 survey is that, of the six factors put forward to the 
interviewee, ability to speak the regional language is relegated to 
fourth position. 49 percent of individuals in category 'O', 61.5 
percent in category 'B' and 67 percent in category 'A' consider that 
it is necessary to speak Catalan in order to be accepted as such. In
33 However, it is difficult to compare the two sets of data due to the 
rather different formulation of the question in the CIS'93 survey. The 
interviewee was asked 'Now, tell me if you consider each of the 
following conditions as necessary for a person to be considered 
Catalan' (and a list containing six sentences or factors is shown to the 
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a way which corresponds to the answers obtained in the 1983 
survey, people in the three largest categories stressed to a greater 
extent than the others factors which are dependent on personal 
choice, as for example 'to want to become Catalan': 93 percent in 
category 'A', 91 percent in category 'B' and 79.5 percent in 
category 'O' considered that a person should primarily have a 
positive attitude to become Catalan in order to be accepted as 
such. The voluntaristic, non-adscriptive factors—more in line 
with what would be implied in the concept of demos, rather than 
that of ethnos—tend to be stressed.
The same patterns in the global degree of exigency— 
dependent on the variable 'mother tongue or language spoken at 
home when a child'—obtain in all six options presented to the 
interviewees in the 1993 survey, except one. That is to say, 
individuals classed in category 'A' are consistently more 
demanding, next in line come those in category 'B' and, at a 
considerable distance, those in category 'O'. The degree of global 
exigency is lowered in line with the objective circumstances of the 
interviewees. Obviously they think of themselves as potential 
claimants to 'catalanness' and want easy access to it, to be 
included and not excluded from the Catalan demos.
The artificiality and limitations of sociological surveys as 
instruments for researching such elusive and ambiguous issues as 
these should put us on our guard when interpreting the results 
that they yield 34. However, in general terms, these indicators are 
in keeping with the conclusions that one can draw using more 
qualitative techniques, as, for instance, those put into effect during 
an extended period of fieldwork in situ... To present here the
34 For a word of caution on the fiability of sociological surveys or 
opinion polls, see: Pierre Bourdieu 'L'opinion publique n'existe pas' in 
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relevant 'ethnographic' evidence collected during fieldwork would 
be too long-winded, though 35.
By way of conclusion, I would like to point out two things. 
Firstly, the lack of correspondence which has already been pointed 
out between the implicit and explicit levels pertaining to the 
representation and expression of collective identities, particularly 
as regards the role ascribed to the ethno-cultural and language 
elements. Secondly, I believe that attention should be drawn to the 
fact that a strong emphasis is laid upon 'civic' values rather than 
'ethnic' or racist ones, when defining collective identity at the 
regional-national level. In short, Catalonia is conceptualised 
more as a demos than as an ethnos. This hypothesis is strongly 
corroborated by the interviewees' replies taken in full context, in 
the frame of the survey's interview itself or elsewhere in more 
ethnographic approaches. The individuals interviewed prioritise 
factors which belong to (roughly speaking!) the ius solis sphere, 
more than those which would belong in the ius sanguinis sphere. 
Stress is placed more on values of citizenship that are befitting of 
an open society than ethno-racial ones characteristic of a closed 
society. That is, citizenship taken in the modern 'republican' sense 
of the concept 36. One could carefully consider to what extent 
political discourse, from the different quarters of the political 
spectrum, corresponds or makes violence in each case to the 
attitudes and representations prevalent among the citizenry.
Whatever be the case, the ethno-linguistic factor is not 
emphasised by common people in explicit discourse, despite its 
unquestionable importance at the cognitive, implicit level. In my 
opinion this is so because the interviewees (and Catalan people in
35 The ethnographic evidence has been presented elsewhere, alongside a 
more detailed analysis of part of the quantitative data which here 
appears in summarised form: Andrés Barrera-Gonzâlez La dialéctica 
de la identidad... op cit pags. 321-331.
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general, in as far as individuals in the sample might be considered 
to represent them) are fully aware of the fact that to do so would 
mean excluding a high percentage of the population who are in all 
other respects fully entitled to Catalan citizenship. However, 
emphasising more immaterial factors related to the individual's 
attitudes, will, and sentiment—in short, the personal disposition 
of claimants to 'catalanness' as regards to all that being Catalan is 
taken to imply—, interviewees manifest a very tolerant attitude 
towards a hypothetical full integration of these 'other Catalans' 
into the Catalan demos in a not too distant future 37. Adopting a 
less open and tolerant attitude would effectively run the risk to 
provoke the severance of Catalan society in two distinct 
ethnolinguistic social categories, and their potential confrontation 
along socioeconomic and politico-cultural cleavage lines. This is a 
scenario which the larger political parties in Catalonia have 
always been anxious to prevent becoming a reality. The consensus 
at the political-partisan level—often put, in later times, under 
considerable strain, due to pressure coming from radical 
nationalistic and other political quarters inside and outside 
Catalonia—is a reflection of a strong de facto and admirable 
consensus previously existing on these issues at the level of 
common citizenry.
D. C onflicting iden tities 
and  political 
p a tte rn s
Individuals become effectively incorporated into a complex 
network of identification references by ascription or through 
cumulative sociopolitical interaction. This could be represented by 
means of an identification matrix, or as in a series of horizontal
37 The concept was invented, and later on adopted as part of popular 
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layers. With regard to the eco-territorial dimensions of collective 
identities, a schema of concentric circles might be a more 
appropriate form of representation. Through the diverse 
processes of socialisation and enculturation, individuals acquire a 
sense of belonging and, given the circumstances, feel compelled to 
express some degree of loyalty to all those collective categories 
and territorial entities to which they have become ascribed 
throughout their life course.
Territorial entities, specifically, can be assembled 
hierarchically. They nest in each other, which allows for a 
simultaneous or parallel expression of loyalty to all of them. 
When, at a certain level of the socioterritorial hierarchy, 
simultaneous expressions of loyalty are felt to be 'logically' 
incongruent or politically incompatible—because both entities are 
seen as exclusive of each other, competing for the same niche in 
the matrix—conflict then arises. Needless to say, these are not 
static phenomena but intrinsically dynamic, variable through time 
and space, and linked to specific global circumstances. The 
analysis of discourse makes it very clear that construction and 
deconstruction of collective identities is, by its very nature, bound 
by circumstance.
Ethnonationalisms or peripheral nationalisms, however we 
might wish to label these historical and sociological phenomena, 
can be construed as examples of the sort of incompatibility or 
conflict of loyalties described above in the abstract. No conflict 
would arise just because individuals feel Catalan, no matter how 
strongly, as long as that sentiment is not founded to any 
significant degree on a simultaneous rejection of a sense of 
Spanishness, on a level higher up the hierarchy of nested 
territorial categories.
If we now move on to thinking not in naked logical, but in 
historical terms, we will easily conclude that a smooth assemblage 
of social or territorial entities can very seldom be attained. It is 
more likely that in concrete historical circumstances competition 
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they are real or just perceived as such. For we tend to look at this 
competition in terms of zero-sum or limited-good games logic. 
That is, sociopolitical actors usually take the arena in which 
economic and political competition happens to be a stationary 
rather than an inflationary universe. On the other hand, it so 
happens that collective identities are worked out as much in 
opposition to as in solidarity with each other, which applies as 
much to simple segmentary societies as to larger and complex 
ones, at any of their socioterritorial levels 38. In short, conflict 
erupts when one entity encroaches upon another's political field, 
or is perceived as having encroached upon it historically. Such 
conflict manifests itself in a competitive struggle for the same 
ecopolitical niche.
Let us now look briefly at the dynamics of this type of 
conflictive process. Writing about collective identities in Spain at 
the local level, the ethnologist Caro Baroja makes use of the 
concept of sociocentrism. Sociocentric discourse revolves around 
praise of the virtues of the group to which one belongs and 
loathing of the real or imaginary shortcomings of the rival 
neighbouring ones. Villagers, in this case, attempt to enhance 
what they perceive as their ethical and moral strengths by 
contrasting them with the perceived weaknesses of the 
neighbouring village groups, which are exaggerated and made 
into a caricature. The logic and dynamics of this kind of discourse, 
crude but appallingly effective, and in specific historical
38 By way of a first entry into the field of ethnological literature on this 
matter, see: E.E. Evans-Pritchard The Nuer Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1940; Fredrik Barth Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social 
Organization of Culture Difference Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969; 
R.A. LeVine; D.T. Campbell Ethnocentrism: Theories o f Conflict, 
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circumstances frighteningly so, springs from three basic practical 
beliefs 39:
a) That the worthy things are those which belong to Us;
b) In contrast, what belongs to Them is worthless and 
despicable;
c) And, worst of all is that which belongs to our closest 
neighbours.
Sociocentrism or exacerbated localism, as in the case of most 
'ethnonational' identities, operates by the unfolding of two 
complementary impulses: a drive or impulse of homology towards 
the inside of the group, and a drive of differentiation towards 
outside groups, in keeping with Caro Baroja's terminology. These 
two practical coexisting impulses prove useful in highlighting 
what we think we share or have in common with individuals 
categorised as being members of the in-group; and in parallel, 
what sets us apart from individuals categorised as being members 
of out-groups. In functionalistic terms, we also know that group 
identity is enhanced through a process of dialectical juxtaposition 
of outgroups on the same structural level. Thus, sociocentrism can 
be understood as a variant of a more universal phenomenon, 
namely ethnocentrism. The fact that ethnocentric attitudes, and 
the concomitant prejudices and stereotypes about the external 
Others, are so widespread is maybe due to a sort of universal 
human urgency to feel that one is right, and somehow morally 
superior to those around oneself 40. Moreover, we have got to 
trust that our reality model or ivorld view, and the ways of doing
39 Julio Caro Baroja 'El sociocentrismo de los pueblos espanoles' en 
Razas, pueblos y linajes Madrid: Istmo, 197?
40 There are also important implications at the level of economic and 
social interaction. For ethnic boundaries, which are maintained in 
spite of systematic exchanges across them, might serve important 
functions at the social, political and economic level. On the uses of the 
frontier, see the classic work by Fredrik Barth, ed. Ethnic groups and 
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things (ethics, morals) that spring from it, are basically correct, 
good and proper. Thus, the struggle for identity unfolds on two 
levels simultaneously, between two poles 41: a positive impulse 
which increases the sense of belonging and participation of 
individuals in the life of the in-group, and an impulse in the 
opposite direction which stresses differentiation, exclusion and 
eventually aggression towards individuals perceived as being 
members of rival out-groups, the external 'Others'.
In my research I have studied the workings of collective 
identities at different levels of sociopolitical interaction, and 
specifically at the different levels on the socioterritorial scale. And 
surely it can be observed that basic parallels exist in this respect at 
the local and the regional or national level. I will here refer only to 
findings concerning the ethnoregional level, though. In carrying 
out the 1983 sociological survey, I paid specific attention to the 
analysis of the role played by prejudice and stereotypes in 
enhancing in-group identity and a sense of cohesiveness. It was 
found that for Catalans self-assertion as such goes with, or 
implies, the following:
a) An overestimation of ethical and moral values attributed to 
the Catalan ethnos as compared to those attributed to other 
ethnoregional out-groups. This comes as no surprise, since we 
have already made reference to the universality of ethnocentric 
attitudes. It is worth mentioning, though, the high rate of self­
esteem shown by Catalans as an ethnonational group.
b) The most negative stereotypes are used against those 
ethnoregional out-groups that are perceived as being the greatest 
rivals or competitors in the Spanish political arena. That is, people 
from Madrid and, for different, complex reasons, people from the 
region of Valencia, despite the fact that they share a language and
41 As professor Dieter Langewiesche would put it: 'Participation and 
Aggression: The Historical Role of Nationalism' , paper presented at 



























































































- 4 8 -
a good part of their history. The consistently unfavourable 
stereotypes and prejudiced opinions expressed against these 
regional out-groups reflect the perception of the existence of 
tension and conflict in their mutual relationships. At the same 
time, prejudice might act as justification for an estranged or 
hostile de facto attitude and behaviour towards them.
c) Stereotypes serve the useful purpose of drawing clear-cut 
boundaries between the dialectically opposed ethnocultural 
groups, increasing the sociocultural distance that is perceived as 
setting them apart. Objective or imaginary differences in values, 
idiosyncrasies, ideologies, etc. are emphasised and manipulated to 
achieve this end.
d) Expressions of 'solidarity across ethnic boundaries' can 
sometimes be observed at work, in favour of those out-groups 
which are perceived as being similarly in conflict with the 
'common enemy', the centralist Spanish state, reified in the 
national capital city Madrid. This, from the Catalan perspective, 
applies mainly to Basques, and to a lesser extent to Galicians as 
well.
e) A positive, neutral or only slightly negative stereotype is 
construed in relation to those regional out-groups which are not 
perceived as posing a threat in any way. This reflects a 
relationship free of tensions, sometimes favoured by sheer 
geographical or sociopolitical distance.
All these strategies of differentiation and in-group identity 
assertion serve the purpose of drawing clear-cut boundaries at the 
symbolic-political level, particularly where not much of an 
objective boundary really exists. Indirectly, they also serve the 
functional purpose of enhancing a sense of internal 'ethnic 
solidarity' and compactness, assuming that the members of the 
sociocultural category concerned have so many things in common. 
In short, at work is an effort aimed at giving a homogeneous 
image of the in-group and establishing clear cut boundaries 
differentiating it from out-groups. This might serve to justify 
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those taken as 'Other' in opposition to 'Us'. Blind in-group 
solidarity is thus shown to be an inescapable need somehow, a sort 
of moral and political imperative imposed upon the individual, the 
more so in the context of perceived threats to the integrity of the 
in-group, which at a certain stage does not matter whether they 
are real or imaginary anymore.
Yet, stereotypes and prejudice are not articulated with the 
same intensity and consistency by every individual of the in-group. 
Many might even actively resist sharing those prejudices and 
stereotypes. Nevertheless, they characteristically permeate the 
social body. They dominate public opinion and attitudes in the 
group as a whole. In times of crisis (a period of weakness or break 
up of the encompassing polity and/or interethnic strife) strong 
evidence exists which shows how easily prejudices can spread 
throughout and dominate the attitudes and actual behaviour of 
the group as a whole, giving way to hostility and violence against 
all the members of perceived enemy out-groups indiscriminately.
As generalised phenomena, collective identities (ethnic and 
national identities would be specific forms of collective identity) 
cannot be reduced nor confined to their economic or sociological 
constituent elements, whatever we might take them to be. 
Consciousness of being or belonging is of the utmost importance. 
Consciousness of belonging partially derives from historical 
'objective' fact—redefined or recreated in every circumstance—, 
particular shared world views and idiosyncrasies, and cultural 
specificities. That is, a degree of 'ethnic' substantive content ought 
to exist. However, all this would have to be mobilised by political 
will in specific historical circumstances, so as to become an active 
collective identity. Beyond that, for a forthright ethnonationalist 
movement to become a political actor, a consistent ideology and a 
political agenda has to be articulated. Moreover, for such a 
movement to be successful, an opportunity has to arise to seize 
power from the centre that has been monopolising it so far. 
Roughly speaking, this is analogous to that conceptual distinction 
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old-fashioned nowadays—between class in itself and class for 
itself. But let us now proceed to analyse the Catalan case as one 
such ethnonationalist phenomenon.
As I mentioned before, my primary interest at the time of 
carrying out field research in 1980-83 was to analyse how 
collective identities are defined in discourse. Moreover, I tried to 
measure the extent to which those feelings of belonging to an 
entity named Catalonia were widespread and how strong they 
were. To that end—and as a complement to a prolonged period of 
in situ fieldwork—I carried out a sociological survey. One of the 
questions, in open-ended format, put to the interviewees was: 
'Imagine that you are now in a foreign country. What ivould you 
say if someone is to ask you: "where are you from”?' Here are the 
results, in percentages, differentiating the answers of 
autochthonous Catalan speakers (category 'A') from those of 
Castilian-speaking immigrants (category 'B'):
* Category 'A' ** Category 'B'
From Catalonia, Catalan 30.2 7.9
From Catalonia, Spain (both) 35.0 8.9
From 'near Barcelona' 5.2 —
From Spain, Spanish 26.7 70.3
(N = 400) (n = 288) (n = 101)
* Autochthonous, of Catalan mother tongue
* * First and second generation immigrants, of Castilian or Spanish
mother tongue
Being in a hypothetical foreign country many autochthonous 
Catalans often show a strong urge to identify themselves as such, 
so as to try to avoid being categorised as Spanish—as would 
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feel uneasy about. This motivation is heightened because many of 
them, as they will readily tell you, have experienced how hard it is 
having to work against established national categories and the 
prejudices and stereotypes they carry with them. In short, their 
consciousness of belonging to an entity named Catalonia is 
asserted more effectively vis a vis those entities on the level of 
established nation-states (implicitly showing what their political 
aspirations are); and in dialectical opposition to the political entity 
that encompasses them and somehow denies their becoming a 
distinguishable entity in turn, an independent whole 42. In their 
answers to this open-ended hypothetical question, interviewees 
often go on to explain that, in any case, what they would like to 
stress to their interlocutors, with their atypical hypothetical 
answer, is the fact that they are a different people, not quite like 
the rest of the Spaniards.
Writing about the emergence of new states in the colonial 
periphery, Clifford Geertz points out that 'new states are 
abnormally susceptible to serious disaffection based on primary 
attachments' (those derived from kinship, religion, language, or 
distinctive cultural traits) 43. In many respects, this has been
42 Thus, the Government of the Generalitat de Catalunya felt perfectly 
justified in spending hundreds of millions on a publicity campaign in 
the run-up to the Olympic Games '92, which was carried in several 
major international newspapers and magazines, to educate the world 
(and obliquely the domestic fold as well) concerning the existence of 
an entity known as Catalonia, which must stand by itself. The motto of 
that publicity campaign was: 'Where is Barcelona?' [printed on a 
physical map of the Iberian Peninsula] 'In Catalonia, of course' [phrase 
now standing below a print with the boundaries of Catalonia 
highlighted, against the background of the same physical map]. 
Needless to say, this publicity was well reported in the Spanish press 
and media, eliciting an uproar of criticism and even outrage. The 
Generalitat authorities had in this way an indirect confirmation of 
their conviction that symbols are shares with a good political return, 
thus worth investing in.
43 Clifford Geertz The Interpretation of Cultures New York: Basic Books, 
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proved valid also in the case of some old European states—with 
constituent units that display differential ethnocultural 
compositions, and that are badly integrated due to cleavages of 
different character and perceived differing interests—, showing 
how resilient primordial feelings and loyalties can be. Following 
Geertz's argument, I am making a distinction between the concept 
of primordial loyalties and that of civic attachments.
Thus, we will observe that in the case of Catalonia 
primordial sentiment does not correspond to the boundaries of the 
established nation-state, at least regarding a sizable proportion of 
the population. There exists a very noticeable split in primordial 
sentiment among many Catalans which strongly affects the shape 
of their civic attachments. To many individuals, their assertion as 
Catalans conveys a weakening, even a plain rejection at times, of 
a simultaneous identification as Spanish. In more general terms, 
less loaded politically, one cannot be fully Catalan and Spanish at 
the same time. A number of individuals perceive that both entities 
compete for the status of nation, and are thus judged 
incompatible, since a nation cannot be ultimately subordinated to 
another. And in the last instance, there is no doubt where 
primordial loyalties would lie for many people.
In two open-ended questions I asked interviewees for a 
personal appraisal of the entities 'Catalonia' and 'Spain': 'What is 
Catalonia/Spain for you?' An overwhelming majority of the 
individuals interviewed gave very positive appraisals of 
Catalonia, quite independently of their having Catalan or Spanish 
as their mother tongue, that is, independently of their 
ethnocultural identity. Nevertheless, autochthonous interviewees 
often replied emphatically, their appraisals of Catalonia being 
generally not just positive but emotionally-charged. The 
consensus beyond 'ethnolinguistic boundaries' concerning 
Catalonia, did not hold when they were asked to make an 
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contrasted along the ethnolinguistic boundary:
39.8 % 
and 75.5%
of autochthonous interviewees (category 'A') 




of autochthonous interviewees (category 'A') 
of non-autochthonous (category 'B')
gave negative replies
Having made a detailed statistical analysis of the data 
gathered with these two open-ended questions, the following 
conclusions can be drawn: It is the youngest, and also the oldest, 
those with higher levels of formal education and those aligning 
themselves with nationalist political parties (this last, of course, is 
close to a meaningless tautology!) who reject the concept of Spain 
more radically, manifesting in higher proportions that they have 
negative or indifferent feelings towards it. That is, they do not 
show a great deal of political loyalty towards the nation-state. 
This contrasts with a generally favourable attitude and strong 
primordial loyalty manifested towards the nation, that is 
Catalonia: age, formal education and political alignment having 
no noticeable bearing in this respect. It would be interesting to 
thoroughly investigate to what extent these attitudes, feelings and 
opinions might have changed after ten years of coexistence in a 
fully democratic Spain. But, again, it would be too laborious to do 
so at this stage. I will only briefly comment on some additional 
data derived from two analogous questions put in the CIS'93 
survey.
The problem with the two relevant questions in the CIS'93 
survey is that—apart from their being closed-ended instead of 
open-ended questions—, there exists a lack of correspondence in 
the formulation of both the questions and the options given the 
interviewee to choose from in each of them, that about the 
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is potentially a strong biasing factor 44. Nevertheless, here are the 
relevant results. Catalonia is considered 'a nation' by 46 percent of 
individuals in category 'A', as well as 32.5 percent in category 'C'; 
but only 13 percent in category 'B' and '5' percent in category 'O' 
choose that definition of Catalonia. 51.5 percent of individuals in 
category 'O' choose the now debasing characterisation of 
Catalonia as 'a region of Spain'; as well as 27 percent of 
individuals in category 'B', but only a handful of people in 
categories 'A' (11 percent) and 'C' (8.5 percent) do so. The aseptic, 
matter-of-fact definition of Catalonia as 'an autonomous 
community' is preferred by 40.5 percent of individuals in category 
'B', 33.5 percent of individuals in category 'O', 22.5 percent in 
category 'A' and 22 percent in category 'C'. The more ambiguous 
option, as to what interviewees might take it to mean (although I 
think it is mostly a positive-affective appraisal), phrased as 'a 
people with a language of their own', is chosen by 37 percent of 
individuals in category 'C', 20.5 percent in category 'A', 19.5 
percent in category 'B' and only 9.5 percent in category 'O'. The 
contrast shown in the options chosen by individuals of the 
different 'ethnolinguistic' categories is quite sharp. Catalonia 
means very different things for different people.
And what about Spain? Those options which seem oriented 
to elicit a positive appraisal, by way of an enticing definition of the
44 I wonder whether those responsible for the elaboration of the 
questionnaire were consciously or unconsciously looking for a chance 
to bridge the 'scandalous' gap, which regularly appears in sociological 
surveys of this nature, in the goodwill shown by the interviewees 
towards the nationality and the nation-state, since the formulation of 
the question related to Spain would in principle seem to be intended 
to produce a bias in favour of this entity. If that was the intention, I am 
not sure that they have succeeded in their machinations!, at least in 
what concerns the Catalan sub-sample. It is, in any case, an example of 
poor standards of professionalism. Fortunately, this does not apply to 
the the formulation of the rest of the questions in the questionnaire, 
nor to the project as a whole, which is a remarkably good one 
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entity (see, footnote #44), collect quite disappointing results 
(tricky, isn't it?; there may be a problem of resonance o f relevance 
here, which has foiled the intentions of some anonymous amateur 
sociologist; or was he a masked enemy of Spain, in fact?). A very 
proper civic definition of Spain as 'the state of which I am a 
citizen' is preferred by: 17.5 percent of individuals in category 'A', 
15 percent in category 'B', 10 percent in category 'O' and only 4.5 
percent in category 'C'. More disappointing results were in store 
for the two options that I take as being the most irritatingly 
biased, compared to the formulation of options in the previous 
question on Catalonia. 'A nation of which I feel a member' (in 
contrast with the dry phrase: 'a nation') is chosen by 11.5 percent 
of individuals in category 'B', 8 percent in category 'A', 7 percent in 
category 'C' and 5.5 percent in category 'O'. 'Something special, a 
product of History, which unites those of us who live here, and 
that I would not know how to define' (heavens!) is the option 
chosen by a mere 6.5 per cent of individuals in category 'A', 4.5 per 
cent in category 'C', 2.5 per cent in category 'B' and 1.5 per cent in 
category 'O' (they must have been put off by the vacuous 
pomposity of the paragraph!). The answers of interviewees to this 
question, as it were, cluster around the two remaining options. 
The matter-of-fact definition of Spain as 'a State comprised of 
several nationalities' is chosen by: 54.5 percent of individuals in 
category 'C', 49 percent in category 'A', 22.5 percent in category 'B' 
and 7.5 percent in category 'O'. The vague option, but surely 
positive-affective definition in this context, of 'my country' is 
preferred by: 75.5 percent of individuals in category 'O', 48 percent 
of individuals in category 'B', 29.5 percent in category 'C' and only 
19 percent in category 'A'.
It is evident, again, that Spain means very different things 
for different people (notwithstanding the awkward machinations 
of certain sociologists!). In any case, we have been shown that the 
'ethnocultural (linguistic)' factor is a very powerfully 
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of Catalonia. Statistical analysis consistently shows the existence 
of strong correlations between national identification indices and 
the 'ethnocultural' factor 45. It is never wholly clear, though, who 
have ultimately won a battle fought over meaning, concepts and 
symbols. In the regional context that occupies us now, it seems 
that Catalonia so far has the upper hand, in this peculiar emotive- 
symbolic battle with Spain, at this historico-political moment. 
Nonetheless, one should be aware that symbols follow their own 
winding paths, hidden to a common person's sight, and that they 
might suddenly emerge into the open with a powerful thrust, 
taking by surprise many who were complacently sitting on the 
Pandora's box to which they thought they had the key 46.
Next to the question commented on above, I asked the 
interviewees in northeastern Catalonia, in 1983, to state more 
explicitly which was the label that they thought might better 
correspond to their feelings concerning 'national self­
45 The above mentioned correspondence is not so strong and consistent 
in the case of the Basque Country, though. And interestingly enough, 
the correlation is very weak, almost non-existent, in another two of 
the cases studied in the CIS'93 survey: Galicia and the Pais Valencia. A 
thorough analysis of the results of this survey along the lines referred 
to here is made in the second of the papers presented at the European 
Forum, confirming this striking contrast between Catalonia and 
Euskadi on one hand, and Galicia and Pais Valencia on the other, as to 
the determining and explanatory value of the ethno-linguistic factor.
46 I am sure that many were taken aback in Catalonia by such a sudden 
reappearence of unmistakeable signs of strong Spanish nationalist or 
patriotic pride, which they might have thought well buried, on 
Catalan soil at least, when the Olympic stadium in Barcelona was 
flooded with an astonishing sea of Spanish flags on the occassion of 
the soccer final, when Spain's team defeated Poland's. And this 
happened right at the time when so many crucial battles had been won 
for Catalonia in the same arena, having to do with the use of Catalan 
as one of the official languages and the prominent place accorded to 
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identification', choosing among five given possibilities, in a close- 
ended question. These are the results:
Category 'A' Category 'B'
Just Spanish 0.7 % 44.3 %
More Spanish than Catalan 1.4% 13.2 %
As much Spanish as Catalan 19.4 % 30.2 %
More Catalan than Spanish 39.8 % 7.5 %
Just Catalan 38.8 % 2.8 %
(N = 400) (n = 294) (n = 106)
It can be observed that a marked contrast is apparent 
between the replies of autochthonous individuals and those of first 
and second generation immigrants to the region. For most of the 
former, strong identification as Catalans completely 
overshadows, even negates, their expected simultaneous 
identification as Spanish. In analysing the influence of several 
main independent variables, I found again that it is the youngest 
(and the oldest), those with higher levels of formal education and 
those aligning themselves with nationalistic political parties (a 
rather tautological correlation) who overemphasise their identity 
as primarily or exclusively Catalan. (Notwithstanding the 
unresolved methodological quandary of to what extent a simple 
question in a sociological questionnaire is appropriate to research 
such a complex issue!). Whatever be the case, a major breach 
occurs in the logical argument of simultaneous ascription to the 
nested socioterritorial categories (the identification matrix: for a 
fair proportion of autochthonous Catalans, simultaneous loyalty 
to Spain and Catalonia is not possible). The dilemma is solved by 
choosing to pay primordial loyalty to their 'lesser' nationality over 
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The reasons explicitly given, when asked, for this rejection 
or denial of emotional-political attachment to the nation-state are 
several. Namely, the suppression and persecution suffered by 
Catalan culture and language after 1939; the entrenched certainty 
of having been discriminated against by the Spanish Centralist 
Administration in all circumstances; the deep feeling that as 
Catalans they are viewed with envy and enmity by other 
Spaniards. Current and historical facts, real or imaginary, are 
brought forward as undeniable and absolute arguments to 
demonstrate the misfortunes that belonging to the Spanish state 
has brought upon Catalonia, thus justifying political 
estrangement and a longing for greater autonomy, and eventually 
a explicit desire for political independence from Spain 47.
The results of the 1983 survey, carried out in northeastern 
Catalonia, are basically consistent with those derived from the 
majority of similar surveys carried out since 1980, and based on a 
sample of the whole region. Let us look at some results from the 
most recent one, CIS'93.
Cat. O' Cat. 'A' Cat. B' Cat. C
Only Spanish 48 1 18 2
More Spanish than Catalan 13 1 9.5 2
As much Spanish as Catalan 34.5 27.5 51.5 37
More Catalan than Spanish 3.5 37 16.5 45.5
Only Catalan 1 33.5 4.5 13
(N = 1007) (n = 259) (n = 394) (n = 269) (n = 46)
47 See: A. Estrade, M. Treserra Catalunya Independent? Barcelona: 
Fundacio J. Bofill, 1990. Also: Andres Barrera Gonzalez La dialectica de 
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We have to bear in mind that in the CIS'93 survey a regional 
sample was taken, whereas in that of 1983 only the northeastern 
corner of Catalonia was sampled. Besides, a more complex 
categorisation of the ethnocultural variable has been worked out 
in the former—based on the language the interviewees declared 
as their 'mother tongue'—in contrast with the dichotomous one 
used in the latter (see footnote at the beginning of chapter C for a 
description of the four categories). In any case, this particular 
question is a device with which some sort of 'national self- 
identification' is intended to be measured. No matter how 
artificial the question might be, it is a fact that most of the 
interviewees find it somehow relevant and give a reply to it; or to 
be more precise, they choose one from among the options put to 
them.
The more complex categorisation of the last variable allows 
for a more subtle analysis of its interaction with the 'national self- 
identification' variable. Overall, one can observe that, again, a 
very strong correlation with the ethnolinguistic variable is 
revealed in the Catalan case. Non-autochthonous individuals 
who have no command of spoken Catalan identify themselves in a 
greater proportion as 'only Spanish' (48 percent), only 4.5 percent 
choosing options where the label Catalan overshadows that of 
Spanish. Quite a different pattern is revealed in the case of first 
and second generation immigrants who have gained a command 
of spoken Catalan (category 'B'): 51.5 percent identify themselves 
as 'as much Spanish as Catalan', 27.5 percent opt for the labels in 
which Spanish overshadows Catalan, and 21 percent the opposite 
option. This category of individuals seem to see themselves as 
having a dual identity. Autochthonous individuals and the 
offspring of mixed marriages (categories 'A' and 'C  respectively) 
choose to identify themselves as primarily or even exclusively 
Catalan in overwhelming proportions.
Turning to the analysis of how certain factors correlate with 
the 'national self-identification' variable, consistent patterns 
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others of an analogous character carried out since 1980 in 
Catalonia 48. The strongest correlation always obtains with the 
'ethno-cultural-linguistic' factor. Next in importance seems to be 
the gender factor: women identify preferably with Catalonia in 
significantly higher proportions than men. Younger people as well 
as the older generation identify more strongly with Catalonia 
than middle-aged individuals. The level of formal education 
positively correlates with a leaning towards the Catalan pole in 
the 'national self-identification' scale.
Regarding the evolution of this ad hoc 'national self- 
identification' index over time, we should firstly point out the 
remarkable consistency and stability of the patterns that emerge in 
surveys carried out in Catalonia from 1983 to 1993. 
Notwithstanding the basic stability of the pattern, one can observe 
that a certain polarisation has taken place. A number of 
individuals who ten years ago identified themselves as 'as much 
Spanish as Catalan' choose to move either to the Spanish pole or, 
in greater numbers, towards the Catalan pole 49. This is congruent 
with the evolution of voting patterns in Catalonia over the same 
period of time, which show a consolidation of the hegemony of the 
center-right nationalist coalition CiU, as well as a significant 
advance of the radical center-left nationalist party ERC.
Nonetheless, we should be wary of establishing a 
straightforward, superficial and simplistic link between the 
'ethnocultural' factor, political ideology and voting behaviour. 
Overall, there is definitely a strong statistical correlation in this
48 Cf. Ramon M. Canals et al L'electorat català a les eleccions 
autonòmiques de 1988: opinions, actituds i comportaments Barcelona: 
Fundació Jaume Botili, 1991, esp. chapters V and VI.
49 A summary of results derived from surveys carried out by the CIS 
from 1984 to 1988 has been collected and analysed in Ramon M. Canals 
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case 50, yet the relationship could be a little more indirect than one 
might take it to be. Thus, it is clear that for a majority of 
interviewees the choice of one or the other label, from the Spanish 
to the Catalan pole, has to do primarily with sentiment and 
identity, with no straightforward political implications. Analysing 
carefully how such a fundamental factor as gender intervenes 
here, proves just that. Women, we have pointed out, preferably 
identify in a significantly higher degree than men with Catalonia. 
Yet, at the same time, indices of political-partisan disinterest, of 
abstention in elections, and lack of explicit articulation of political 
options, etc. are consistently higher among women. In the last 
instance, we would have to take into account differences in the 
outlook of women and men towards the outside world, and the 
sub-universe of politics specifically, contrasts in their values 
system, and different socialisation patterns, to account for the 
identified contrast between women and men in what concerns 
'national self-identification'.
But we must return to our point of departure, after a 
relevant detour, to confirm: sentiment and self-identity strongly 
correlate with voting behaviour in Catalonia at this historical 
moment. Individuals who lean towards the Spanish pole in the 
'national self-identification' scale tend to vote for 'Spanish'
50 No doubt should remain on this point. The correlation is so strong in 
this case that there is not much to do by way of further statistical 
analysis (although it is of course interesting to look at the data in 
detail). Nonetheless, just because a strong statistical correlation 
appears, does not mean to say that it is proof of the existence of a 
necessary and full relationship. Besides, the correlation works for the 
Catalan case, yet it does not do for analogous cases such as those of 
Galicia and Pais Valencià, as pointed out earlier on in this chapter. 
Reflections on the limits of sociological surveys as tools of research— 
commented upon elsewhere—surely apply here. See: F. Pallarès, R.M. 
Canals, M.R. Virós 'Els eixos de competència electoral' in L'elector at 
cat alà... It is also imperative to put under close critical scrutiny the 
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parties such as Partido Popular, CDS or PSC/PSOE; whereas 
individuals who lean towards the Catalan pole vote for 'Catalan' 
parties CiU, ERC, PSUC (IC/IU), PSC/PSOE, in this order of 
preference. Among the latter, women prefer the center-right 
moderate nationalist CiU to a greater extent than men. The 
inverse pattern, as regards gender, is apparent in relation to ERC, 
a center-left, radical nationalist party 51.
The Catalan Statute was approved at the end of 1979. A few 
months later the first elections to the Catalan Parliament in this 
new democratic era were held. The center-right nationalist party 
CiU obtained 27.7 percent of the vote. ERC, a centre-left party 
which is more radically nationalist, gained 8.9 percent of the vote. 
The hopes of an electoral victory on the part of the parties of the 
traditional left were dashed in these elections, as the voting 
patterns shifted considerably in comparison with the previous 
Spanish general elections of 1979. This shift led to CiU's share of 
the vote increasing from 16.1 percent in the G-79 general elections 
to 27.7 percent in the A-80 regional elections. In contrast, the 
PSC's 29.2 percent in the G-79 general elections fell to 26.6 percent 
in the A-80 autonomous ones. Incidentally, this was the first clear 
sign of an electoral phenomenon—of key importance in the 
political panorama of Catalonia—which was to recur in 
subsequent elections: the shifting electoral loyalties of a significant 
(and decisive) section of the electorate, depending on the type of 
election held: national or regional. This is what political scientists
51 R.M. Canals et alii L'electorat catala a les eleccions autondmiques de 
1988: opinions, actituds i comportaments Barcelona: Fundacio Jaume 
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call the 'shifting vote' or 'dual vote' 52 We will return to this most 
important and significant issue later on.
Steady growth of the nationalist vote has been apparent in 
Catalonia since the first democratic elections held in Spain in 1977. 
This growth has been at the cost of parties of the left and, to a 
lesser extent, the conservative 'Spanish' parties, disparagingly 
referred to from self-identified nationalist quarters as 'partidos 
sucursalistas' (that is, mere Catalan 'branches' of Spanish 
parties). The general evolution of voting patterns in Catalonia can 
be better illustrated—for the purposes of this paper—by 
contrasting the percentage of the vote won by the expressly 
defined nationalist parties, the centre-right CiU and the centre- 
left ERC 53, against the vote of the most successful party that does 
not fall neatly into the nationalist category 54: the Catalan 
Socialist Party (PSC), linked to the Spanish Workers' Socialist 
Party (PSOE), yet fairly autonomous in its relations with party 
headquarters in Madrid.
52 A detailed and in-depth analysis of this phenomenon, which 
manifests itself so neatly in Catalonia, and with such decisive political 
consequences, has been recently carried out by José R. Montero and 
Joan Font 'El voto dual: lealtad y transferencia de votos en las 
elecciones autonomicas' in R.M. Canals et al Velectorat català... op cit, 
pags 183-215. See, also: Andrés Barrera-Gonzâlez La dialéctica de la 
identidad... op cit, apendix 3.
53 As with the data commented upon in the previous paragraph, 
percentages of the effective vote will be given, rather than percentages 
of the electoral census.
54 There are other important parties, such as the Partit Socialista Unificat 
de Catalunya (PSUC), the communist left, and Partido Popular de 
Cataluna, the Catalan section of the Spanish conservativy right, etc. 
Yet, for the purposes of this paper and for the sake of the specific 
argument to be developed, I did not think it necessary to take into 




























































































Evolution o f  the nationalist vote in Catalonia:
G-77 G -79 A-80 G-82 A-84 G-86 A-88 G-89 A-92 G -93
CiU 16.8 16.1 27.7 22.2 46.6 31.8 45.5 32.7 46.2 31.8
ERC 4.5 4.1 8.9 4.0 4.4 2.7 4.1 2.7 8.0 5.0
VotNac 21.3 20.2 36.6 26.2 51.0 34.5 49.6 35.4 54.2 36.8
PSC 28.4 29.2 22.3 45.2 30.0 40.6 29.6 35.6 27.6 34.9
Abs 20.7 31.5 37.9 19.3 35.7 31.1 40.6 31.6 45.1 23.6
M-79 M-83 E-87 M-87 E-89 M-91
CiU 18.6 25.0 27.3 32.5 27.5 33.7
ERC 3.8 2.9 3.6 2.4 3.3 3.4
VotNac 22.4 27.9 30.9 34.9 30.8 37.1
PSC 26.6 31.6 36.2 37.0 36.5 37.5
Abs 39.1 32.4 31.5 31.5 47.5 41.8
Sources:
Atlas Electoral de Catalunya, 3 Barcelona: Fundació Bofill, 1981 
Atlas Electoral de Catalunya, 9 Barcelona: Fundació Bofill, 1990 
Elecciones al Parlamento de Cataluna, 1992, Madrid, Ministerio del 
Interior, 1992
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The Catalan electorate has voted the PSC into power—by a 
comfortable majority—in all the general, municipal (the 
Barcelona town council in particular) and European elections held 
in Catalonia from 1977 to 1993. Although since the general 
elections of 1982—in which it won an overwhelming majority of 
the vote (45.2 percent), in line with its national counterpart, which 
won by an absolute majority and subsequently came to power in 
Madrid—the PSC's lead over the CiU has been gradually eroded 
in these type of elections as well. This is doubtlessly linked to the 
PSOE's decline at the national level. However, the same 
electorate has consistently voted Convergencia i Unio to victory in 
the elections to the Catalan regional parliament. CiU won its first 
victory in the first regional elections, celebrated in 1980, although 
it was only by a margin of five percent. At that point, the Catalan 
socialists, frustrated by their unexpected defeat, turned down the 
formal invitation to enter a coalition government with the 
nationalists of CiU—perhaps thus sealing their political fate with 
respect to the government of the Generalitat 55. In this way, and 
despite its parliamentary minority, CiU was able to govern in 
Catalonia for the next four years.
Two years after PSOE's crushing victory in the national 
elections, and that of its Catalan counterpart, the PSC, in 
Catalonia (who won 45.2 percent of the valid votes, the highest 
ever in any election), the nationalist coalition CiU retorted with 
greater rotundity in the elections to the Catalan Parliament of 
1984. CiU saw its share of the vote increase from 22.2 percent in 
G-82 to 46.6 percent in A-84, while the PSC's vote diminished by 15 
points, from 45.2 percent to 30.0 percent.
55 As well as leaving in the sole hands of the nationalists of CiU the 
building from scratch of the Generalitat's administration at this crucial 
stage! This decision of the Catalan Socialists is widely considered 
today as shortsighted and a very grave mistake, from which profound 
consequences on the character of the Catalan autonomous 
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This extraordinary shift in the vote, which swept the 
nationalists to victory, can be explained by the dual vote 
phenomenon, which was most clearly evident at work in the A-84 
regional elections. The other extremely important factor to 
account for CiU's victory by an absolute majority was the 
oscillation in electoral participation. In general terms, abstention 
in Catalonia—as well as in the rest of Spain—has increased 
notably since 1982 (although a noticeable recovery in participation 
levels occurred in the general elections of 1993). However, 
abstention in Catalonia is always 12 to 15 percent higher in each 
regional election by comparison with the general elections that 
immediately precede them. This growth in abstention rates has 
negatively affected the PSC to a much greater extent than the 
other parties. In contrast, it works in favour of the nationalist 
parties, particularly CiU, because the support for the latter is 
stable and loyal. Consequently, the absolute number of votes for 
CiU does not need to increase in regional elections for its share of 
the effective vote to rise considerably, thus allowing them to stay 
at the helm of the Catalan government to the present day. Since 
1980, and more so since 1984, the CiU nationalists have reaped the 
benefits of these striking electoral phenomena, which are so 
pronounced and characteristic of the Catalan electorate.
Dual voting patterns—and oscillations in abstention rates— 
recurred with the same clarity in the A-88 regional elections as in 
comparison with the G-86 general elections; and again in the 1992 
regional elections as compared with the G-89 general elections. 
Perhaps the 'wisdom' of the Catalan electorate lies in having 
clearly understood, and acted upon this knowledge consistently, 
that one of the basic principles of a stable democracy is the sharing 
and division of power. Thus, the Catalan electorate consciously (if 
we judge by the evidence) or intuitively aims at placing the PSC 
socialists in charge at the local-municipal level (the city of 
Barcelona, the municipalities in its industrialised periphery and 
other large towns in Catalonia) and the CiU nationalists in charge 
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The fact that the Socialists win a majority of votes in the 
Catalan constituencies when representatives to the Spanish and 
European parliaments are being elected, tells us who practises 
dual voting or exercises to a greater degree their right to 
abstention on certain occasions. These voters are essentially 
located in the left and centre-left sections of the political field, and 
are surely first or second generation immigrants from the other 
Spanish regions. The autochthonous part of the electorate, on the 
other hand, do not change their political loyalties or differentially 
abstain to the same degree 56.
As well as indirectly illustrating the strength of the shifting 
vote phenomenon, the cross-tabulation of the 'ethnolinguistic- 
cultural' variable with that of voting allegiance corroborates (in 
the 1983 as well as the CIS'93 sociological surveys) the 
interpretation referred to above. Thus, looking at the CIS'93 data, 
the shifting vote figures—which have to be taken grosso modo, 
bearing in mind the nature of the source—indicate the following: 9 
percent of voters in category 'O'—the majority of whom regularly 
vote for the PSC—switch their vote to CiU in regional elections, 
in which 3 percent more of them abstain 57. Individuals in category 
'B' (who currently vote for the PSC, although a considerable 
proportion also support CiU, and even 2-3 percent of them vote 
for ERC) behave similarly to category 'O' voters: in the 1992 
regional elections 10 percent switched their vote to CiU, 2 percent
56 More on this in: J.R. Montero, J. Font 'El voto dual: lealtad y 
transferencia de votos en las elecciones autonômicas' en R.M. Canals 
et al L'electorat català...
57 The measured oscillation is that which occurs between the general 
elections of 1989 and the regional elections of 1992, always taking as 
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to ERC and 5 percent opted for abstention 58. A proportionately 
much higher percentage of individuals, 13 percent of them, in 
marginal category 'C' (who currently give their support in similar 
proportions to CiU and the PSC, as well as 6.5 percent for IC/IU, 
and 2-4 percent for ERC) switch their vote to CiU in the regional 
elections; an additional 2.5 percent switch to ERC; finally, these 
voters do not abstain in greater proportion in regional elections, 
in fact quite the opposite happens, since there is 2 percent less 
abstention. Lastly, 5 percent of category 'A' individuals 
(autochthonous)—the vast majority of whom vote generally CiU 
or ERC—switch their vote to CiU; 4 percent switch to ERC; and 
two percent more abstain in the regional elections as in 
comparison with the previous general elections.
In conclusion, this is an extraordinary phenomenon, which 
shows a considerable portion of the Catalan electorate to be 
taking decisions with surprising consistency. What is more, those 
decisions are decisive in determining the composition of the 
Catalan political panorama and, specifically, the government of 
the autonomous community. The slogan of these 'other Catalans' 
could well be: 'We leave the governing of Catalonia to the 
Catalans (the autochthonous, the "true" Catalans!)'. So, if this 
interpretation is correct, even only partly so, we have before us an 
extraordinary phenomenon which we could name electoral 
incantation, since the above-mentioned argumentation, which in
58 The patterns of electoral abstention here analysed grosso modo using 
survey data are congruent with the well documented fact that 
abstention in Catalonia is noticeably higher in regional elections than 
in general elections, even higher than in local elections. Percentages of 
electoral abstention are relatively higher: in the metropolitan area of 
Barcelona and the industrial belt around the city of Tarragona, among 
individuals in the age group 26-40 years old and among those who 
have only a low level of formal education. Which clearly identifies 
who they are: mostly first and second generation immigrants from 
other regions of Spain. See: Joan Font 'Som dos milions: els 
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its most superficial form seems solidly logical, hides a 
fundamental fallacy. For the PSC is a party which is as much 
nationalist-oriented on many key issues as CiU or ERC might be; 
and equally autochthonous in any case. The majority of the PSC 
leaders—nearly all of them in the top ranks of the party—are 
native Catalans with unquestionable Catalan credentials. 
However, nearly 50 percent of its voters are non-autochthonous 
residents. The PSC carries the immigrant vote. This factor, which 
should work in this party's favour, has become—due to nationalist 
rhetoric and political demagogy—an insurmountable weakness in 
regional elections. The nationalists, particularly those from CiU, 
have won outright the battle of the symbols and implicit meanings, 
by means of nationalist rhetoric which is simultaneously simplistic 
and extremely subtle. They have managed to monopolise the 
name of Catalonia and the strong emotions and primordial 
loyalties which it evokes. In contrast, the PSC socialists have 
failed to mobilise a large sector of its 'natural constituency' in 
regional, Catalan elections, since they have themselves fallen foul 
of the above-mentioned nationalist rhetoric and simplifications, 
manipulated with more dexterity and success by their political 
rivals.
E. Language and
n a tiona list ideologies 
(The politics of language 
and identity in Catalonia)
All societies tend to develop a language, or at least a certain way 
of speaking, for themselves which binds more tightly its 
constituent parts and, on binding them, they are separated from 
others...
Political societies or States have also understood the 
incomparable value of possessing a language which provides 
union and cohesion for its members, separating them from 
others. It follows that, when such an outcome does not occur 
naturally, because the frontiers of the State do not coincide with 
the boundaries of a linguistic unit, they go to great lengths in 
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necessary. In this way they promote the expansion of one 
language, that which they adopt as official, and fiercely combat 
the others until they are corrupted and push them into 
extinction.
For the same reason, peoples who resist absorption by other 
peoples, no sooner they feel the necessity to assert their 
individuality, to proclaim their personality, than they cling on 
to their linguistic unity as a redeeming principle and the 
foundation of their rights. 'Language is nationality itself'— said 
the Hungarian patriots midway through the last century, 
echoing the affirmation of the first German patriots. Language 
is nationality, have proclaimed in their turn all renascent 
peoples. (Enric Prat de la Riba, 1906)59
In addition to being a remarkable political figure and 
president of the Mancomunitat de Catalunya during the first 
three years of its existence, Enric Prat de la Riba (1870-1917) was 
one of the intellectuals who most contributed to articulating a 
nationalist doctrine for Catalonia. The book which contains his 
main essays on the theme, entitled La nacionalitat Catalana, has 
been a considerable influence on all subsequent nationalist 
thought.
German Romanticism was doubtlessly one of Prat de la 
Riba's main sources of inspiration and, in the central European 
events of his time, he found numerous examples which served to 
illustrate his arguments and place the Catalan case in the wider 
European context. Prat de la Riba was convinced that Catalonia's 
problems were of a similar nature to those being experienced by 
Ireland, Hungary, Poland, Flanders and so many other European 
nations or nationalities who were clashing with powerful and 
intrusive neighbours in their struggle to attain full political and 
cultural autonomy. The theme of language occupies a preeminent
59 Enric Prat de la Riba 'Importancia de la llengua dins del concepte de la 
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position in his writings. From one of his essays I have selected the 
paragraphs which introduce this section. Here, Prat de la Riba 
succinctly and forcefully points out—in a line of argument whose 
ultimate implications he was perhaps himself not aware of—the 
basic principles which guide the political actions, offensive or 
defensive, of nationalist movements of either side in relation to 
language. In effect, language can become, in certain historical 
circumstances, a primary foundation for collective identity beyond 
its proper function as a tool for communication, truly a political 
weapon.
The language issue is a highly sensitive issue in regional and 
national politics in Spain today. And it is perhaps the single 
greatest concern for the Generalitat government. It dominates the 
political arena in Catalonia. In fact, the Catalan language and its 
status in regional life has always been one of the main themes 
running through the writings of political thinkers and patriots in 
every walk of life, at least since the Renaixenga revivalist 
movement took a hold in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
The R enaixenga  first started as a cultural and literary 
movement—against a backdrop of remarkable industrial success 
and economic prosperity in the region—that laid strong emphasis 
on the recovery of the vernacular as a means of expression in 
literature and the arts. From these beginnings, it gradually 
developed into a fully-fledged regionalist and, later on, openly 
nationalist movement 60.
60 Josep M. Fradera's Cultura nacional en una societat dividida 
Barcelona: Curial, 1992 is the latest and one of the most interesting 
historical-interpretative accounts of these developments. For a follow 
up of some of the arguments in the debate, although in quite a 
different key, see: Enric Ucelay da Cal Imatge, cultura i politico en 
I'etapa republicana (1931-1939) Barcelona: La Magrana, 1982. But see 
also the more comprehensive: Horst Hina Castilla y Cataluna en el 



























































































- 7 2 -
The crucial importance of the issue of language was 
something which did not escape the attention of those who took 
part in the drafting of the Constitution in 1978, intended as the 
basis for a renewed Spanish State. Consequently, a great amount 
of political energy was invested in the hunt for a formula which 
would be appropriate to lay the foundations for a reasonable 
solution in the future to this sensitive issue, in the new democratic 
era which was then commencing 61. The agreed on formula, which 
as such expresses the desire to attain a balance between the 
various political parties involved, is contained in article 3 of the 
Preamble. In broad terms, it establishes the official status of 
Castilian throughout Spanish territory, as well as the 'co-official' 
status of the various other languages in the territories of the 
respective autonomous communities where they are spoken.
Language has an equally high profile in the Statutes of each 
of the autonomous communities where a language different from 
Castilian is spoken. Thus, in article 3 of Catalonia's Statute of 
Autonomy, the 'co-official' status of Catalan and Castilian—in 
accordance with the constitutional imperative—is established. In 
section 4 mention is made of the respect and protection to which 
the Aranese language is entitled—Aranese being a dialect of 
Gascon spoken in a small area in the north-west of the region. 
Finally, all the above-mentioned autonomous communities have 
subsequently passed 'linguistic normalisation' laws of their own, 
so that linguistic planning policies could be put into effect.
The Law of Linguistic Normalisation (LLN) was passed by 
the Catalan Parliament on the 6th of April, 1983. In laying down 
the basic principles regarding the status of the two languages 
present in Catalonia, this law necessarily evokes those of higher
61 Jordi Sole Tura, one of the persons who participated in the drafting of 
the Constitution, recalls in a recent article (El Pais, 24 February 1994) 
the circumstances in which certain basic agreements were reached, 
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rank on which it is based: The Statute of 1979 and the Constitution 
of 1978. The LLN is aimed at promoting normalisation in the use 
of the Catalan language throughout the territory, especially as 
regards to the public and official spheres where the Generalitat 
government has taken administrative control in accordance with 
the provisions of the Statute of Autonomy: culture, education, the 
state-owned media, and local and regional administration. In a 
tenacious attempt to stretch the Constitution to its limits—in 
favour of the recovery of Catalan in the public sphere—this law 
takes full advantage of the relative ambiguity of constitutional 
concepts regarding the issue of language, in a way which results in 
the pseudo-legal term 'own language' overshadowing the concept 
of 'official language', which has a clearer legal definition. The 
implicit political objective is to make Catalonia's 'own language', 
Catalan—which, at the time the law was drawn up, was still in a 
clearly inferior position as regards to its use and presence in public 
spheres—into the 'standard language' or de facto main language 
throughout the territory of the Autonomous Community of 
Catalonia. The interpretation can be pushed no further as it 
cannot become the only official language due to the provisions 
made in the Constitution, which declares Castilian to have full 
'co-official' status in the autonomous communities with a 
language of their own, and the duty of every Spanish citizen to 
know it.
As is reflected in its preamble, the explicit objective of the 
LLN is to stimulate 'the normalisation of the use of the Catalan 
language throughout Catalan territory'. (To restore it) 'to its 
rightful place as Catalonia's own language is the unquestionable 
right and duty of the Catalan people'. The LLN provided the legal 
framework for a far-reaching and complex plan of 
'normalisation' of the regional language to be put into effect. As 
regards to the specific legal uses that can be made of the 'own 
language' concept, I will provide two examples which touch upon 
two fundamental areas. 'Catalan, as Catalonia's own language, 
is also the language of the Generalitat and of the Catalan 
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other public corporations that pertain to the Generalitat.' (art. 
5.1). 'Catalan, as Catalonia's own language, is also the language 
of education at all levels.' (art. 14.1). However, an important point 
is made in the next paragraph which gives explicit legal support to 
a fundamental right established in the Constitution: 'Children 
have the right to receive their early instruction in their usual 
language, be it Catalan or Castilian.' However, the contents of 
the rest of the article underline the fact that this right is 
understood to be subsidiary, since it has to be expressly demanded 
by the pupil concerned or by his or her parents or legal guardians. 
By default, school children of Catalonia will in principle receive 
their education in the Catalan language in all those institutions 
that depend administratively on the Generalitat, which at present 
are all those within the territory of the autonomous community.
In order to fully grasp the significance and the political 
implications of laws, and of this one in particular, it is of the 
utmost importance to look at them in context. In this regard, the 
letter of the law is, in principle, a reflection of the particular 
balance of power which prevails at the particular time and place 
in which it was passed. The more generic implicit political 
meaning of the law, as well as its practical application, can, 
however, veer significantly away from its literal content. 
Authorities other than the legislators who created it are 
responsible for the application of the law. On the other hand, its 
implementation takes place in contexts where the balance of 
political power might potentially be very different from that in 
which the law was passed. Therefore, we should turn our 
attention to events immediately before and after the passing of the 
law, to day-to-day politics and to the doctrine and ideology which 
inspires and drives it. In this way we can draw a fuller picture of 
what the law signified and signifies in relation to what concerns 
us here.
The issue of language—and, to a large extent, the overall 
'national reconstruction' programme in Catalonia—revolves 
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rightful place, after the decades of persecution and banishment 
from public life under Franco; b) the cultural and linguistic 
integration or assimilation of the immigrant, Castilian-speaking 
population—currently about 50 percent of the total population— 
in order to avoid the polarisation of the citizenry into two 
'communities' that are ethnolinguistically different. The former 
theme amounts to a political and moral right which very few 
would call into question. The second is more problematical. Yet, 
the moral and political dilemma is solved from a nationalist 
standpoint by evoking an essentialist concept of the nation:
'The thesis behind this article is that, if practically all the children 
of immigrants are not assimilated before they reach the end of 
their schooling, the survival of the Catalan language will be 
increasingly threatened from within, from the very heart of the 
Principality—the industrial belt around Barcelona 62.' And if the 
language dies, the nation will disappear: 'I take recovery of the 
Catalan language to be fundamental to the future survival of the 
Catalan people' 63 [language is nationality itself, as Prat de la Riba 
would have pointed out!]. In this way: 'linguistic integration is the 
tribute which every immigrant has to pay to the country that 
receives him...'; and bearing in mind 'the scarce or non-existent 
education with which (immigrants) arrive on our soil 
(Catalonia)' 64 ... this is the least they could do!
The link between this essentialist concept of the nation which 
provides the primary basis of legitimacy, and the justification of 
political and administrative measures which would have to be 
implemented to achieve the above-mentioned objectives consists
62 Miquel Strubell i Trueta 'Immigraciô i assimilaciô lingüîstica al 
Principat' (1978) in Llengua i Poblaciô a Catalunya Barcelona: Edicions 
de La Magrana, 1981, pag. 72.
63 Miquel Strubell i Trueta op cit pâg. 27.
64 A.M. Badia i Margarit 'Llengua i immigraciô: de la dictadura a la 
situaciô actual' in VVAA Immigraciô i reconstrucciô nacional a 
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in the 'principle of territoriality'. Citing cases such as those of 
Belgium, Switzerland or Québec confers unquestionable political 
weight on this principle: 'I adopt and depart from a premise based 
on the territorial integrity of language, that is to say, that over 
and above personal considerations, the language of the territory 
(spoken for more than ten centuries, the author mentions at 
another point) must be the only official language, notwithstanding 
the linguistic rights of the temporary or recently arrived 
immigrant' 65.
And to continue with the doctrinal argument along the same 
lines: [The future government of Catalonia will dispose of two key 
instruments in the] 'recatalanisation of the country, which finds 
support in a conception of the hegemony of Catalan culture (in the 
territory of Catalonia): education and the mass media'... 
Considering that 'the Catalan national programme will be 
unviable if a scission occurs between communities' [that are and 
would remain ethnically, culturally and linguistically 
differentiated]. In any case: 'Normalisation should be taken to 
mean the hegemony of Catalan culture within the historical 
territory of Catalonia and the reestablishment of a cultural koiné 
(community) throughout all Catalan countries.' 66 [i.e. all regions 
where Catalan is spoken: Els Pai'sos Catalans].
One of the events which left a deep impression on those who 
were watching closely Spain's transition to democracy—and no 
doubt the post-Francoist political establishment in Madrid in 
particular—was the massive demonstration which filled the 
streets of Barcelona on the Eleventh of September, 1977 (in 
Catalanist epic mythology, the National Day of Catalonia). 
Nearly one and a half million people from all parts of the region 
took part, waving thousands of senyeres (the Catalan flag), 
demanding democratic rights and political autonomy for
65 Miquel Strubell i Trueta op cit pâgs 15, 73.
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Catalonia. Sixteen days later a decree from the Spanish 
government reinstated the Catalan Generalitat.
On the 23rd of October, the president in exile of the 
Generalitat, Josep Tarradellas, was received in Barcelona by a 
fervent multitude as the president of the restored Catalan polity. 
From the balcony of the Palau de la Generalitat, his voice 
trembling with emotion, he pronounced the famous words: 
Ciutadans de Catalunya, ja soc aqui, per a treballar! [Citizens of 
Catalonia, I'm back and ready to set to work!]. This was rapidly 
incorporated into Catalan mythography as: Catalans!, ja soc aqui, 
[Catalans, I'm back!], a stock phrase which has acquired assertive 
nationalist connotations—in the way it is used, if not in its literal 
sense—which do not correspond exactly with the words and the 
political meaning intended by the President! Whatever be the case, 
President Tarradellas soon put into effect his plan of appointing a 
provisional government based on a wide coalition, in which the 
entire political spectrum was represented: socialists and 
communists included.
The year 1978 saw the drafting and finally the passing of the 
new Constitution. In Catalonia a fundamental debate unfolded in 
parallel to that concerning the Constitution. The first draft white 
papers of the future Statute of Autonomy started to circulate 
among the headquarters of the political parties, and the debate 
was known to public opinion through the press. Meanwhile, a 
series of decrees of the Spanish government and the Generalitat 
gradually provided administrative and legal provisions which 
enabled Catalan to be introduced into the educational system. Use 
of Catalan in the press, radio and television also increased 
progressively. The first newspapers to be published entirely in 
Catalan also appeared in the first phase of the transition: Avui in 
Barcelona, Punt Diari in Girona, as well as a myriad of small, 
local weeklies throughout the entire region. The debate 
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particularly the issue of the language was widely discussed during 
this period 67.
Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy was passed by an 
overwhelming majority in the referendum held on the 25th of 
October, 1979 and came into effect two months later. Five months 
later the first general elections to the Catalan Parliament were 
held in which a relative majority of the vote was won by the 
nationalist coalition Convergencia i Unio (CiU) led by Jordi Pujol. 
The establishment of an autonomous parliament and government 
heralded a new era in Catalan politics, one in which new 
measures—which were administratively and legally of a superior 
rank to those of the previous phase—were implemented without 
hindrance in the course of 1980. A Linguistic Policy Department 
was established, as well as an Office for the Normalisation of the 
Official Use of the Catalan Language, and the Catalan 
Sociolinguistics Institute. The Generalitat government took firm 
control of the linguistic planning policy, at all levels, financing 
with public money all types of private initiatives as well as those 
run by local entities, with the aim of reinstating Catalan to its 
rightful place and of making up for lost ground, particularly as 
regards to the social and public use of the language.
In this phase of the transition, the publication in 1979 of a 
manifesto-like article on the state of Catalan and its foreseeable 
future, which rapidly won great renown in catalanist circles, 
triggered with a certain acrimony the political debate on the 
issue 68; the more academic debate had already been tabled in
67 In Albert Balcells Historic) del nacionalisme catal'a, dels ortgens at 
nostre temps Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, 1992 a detailed 
account is given of social and political developments during the 
transitional period. In the report written by J. Webber, M. Strubell The 
Catalan Language... pâgs. 91 y ss, there appears a detailed chronology 
on progress made in the institutionalisation of the Catalan language.
68 Joan A. Argente et al 'Una nació sense estât, un poble sense llengua?' 




























































































books such as the ones cited above. The Els Marges article stirred 
up the controversy about identity and language in Catalonia, 
introducing irredentist elements—and a catastrophic vision— 
which were disturbing at the time. The authors of this manifesto 
considered that the increased legitimacy given by the new 
Constitution to the Spanish State in the emerging democracy— 
new-born and still fragile—presented more of a threat to the 
survival of the Catalan language (and, therefore, the Catalan 
nation itself) than the previous dictatorship had. Under the 
dictatorial regime—it was argued—it was at least easier to rally 
together unanimously under the banner of resistance. Reading this 
manifesto leads one to reflect on the extent to which a culture on 
the defensive, transfixed by fear, takes refuge in secure and 
comforting fundamentalist positions 69.
The publication of the Els Marges manifesto contributed to 
firmly place the issue of language on the political agenda. From 
then on it occupied a prominent position in the agitated and 
emotive debate on the urgent need to proceed to the 'national 
reconstruction' of Catalonia 70. Language was thus converted into 
the most powerful weapon or political instrument in the hands of 
the nationalists, for better or for worse. Certain initiatives on the 
part of the enemies of Catalan nationalism, clumsy or at least 
with a bad sense of timing, fuelled the controversy and helped to 
impose an irresistible political dimension on the language debate. 
As an example, I would like to refer here to the so-called 
'Manifesto of the 2300: for equal language rights in Catalonia', 
which was signed by a number of people who identify themselves 
as 'intellectuals and professionals who live and work in
69 See: Bhikku Parekh, El Pais, 8th of Februaryl994.
70 For a follow up of the line of argument and some politico-philological 
considerations on the future of the Catalan language, see, for example: 





























































































Catalonia', a catch-phrase with semantic and political overtones 
that only a close observer of the Catalan scene can grasp.
This Manifesto is said to have been signed in Barcelona on 
the 25th of January, 1981, although it was made public later on, 
right after the attempted 'coup d'Etat' of 23rd of February! In any 
case, it provoked a similar degree of outrage as that caused by the 
publication of the manifesto-like Els Marges article, although of a 
different nature indeed, in nationalist circles and beyond among 
the general public in Catalonia. The Manifesto o f the 2300 
implicitly responds to the Els Marges article, and the political 
position of the 2300 is clear: There is actually no democratic 
justification for proposals to make Catalan the sole official 
language of Catalonia'. In support of this opinion they invoke the 
letter and the spirit of the Constitution and Catalonia's own 
Statute of Autonomy, and remind the reader of certain 
fundamental social realities, namely the presence of immigrants 
who constitute nearly half of Catalonia's population and whose 
mother tongue is Castilian, not Catalan. The manifesto goes on: 
'Our concern does not stem from an anti-Catalan stand or 
prejudice, but from an appraisal of events which have been taking 
place for some time now (sic), in which rights such as those 
pertaining to the public and official use of Catalan and Castilian, 
to the right to be educated in one's mother tongue and to not be 
discriminated against for reasons of language ... are not being 
respected.' And further on: '(We are) not against the learning of 
Catalan and the use of this language by those who so wish, but 
rather we oppose those who aspire to substitute—as a matter of 
principle—the language of all Castilian speakers for Catalan...' 71.
71 In the line of argument opened up by the Manifesto de los 2.300, 
adopting a rather disordered and emotional approach, see: Azahara 
Larra Servet [the pseudonym carries the message!] Extranjeros en su 
pais Madrid: Ediciones Libertarias, 1992. It has to be pointed out, 
though, that this author is now referring to events which might have 
already happened and been experienced, after several years of
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A candid appraisal of the Manifesto o f the 2300 gives one the 
impression that it draws reasonable and well-argued points, 
which it does. However, uncertainties arise over its interpretation 
when we consider the specific conjuncture in which it appeared. In 
fact, it consists more than anything else of a premature judgment 
over intentions, a set of premonitions, an a priori condemnation of 
excesses yet to be committed. These excesses could not have been 
committed, even though such actions may have been suggested by 
the ideologies of certain nationalist groups, since the reinstated 
Generalitat and the administration put under trial in the 
Manifesto had only taken power a few months before. 
Additionally, if we take into account events and comments made 
by certain individuals in the press, some of whom had signed the 
document, multiple alternative interpretations of the Manifesto 
crop up, and implicit politically partisan overtones override the 
literal message of the Manifesto itself: the message is carried by 
the context!
Whatever be the case, what we can observe at work are 
'collectives' of self-appointed intellectuals on both sides of the
implementation of the policies of 'linguistic normalisation' in 
Catalonia. As a counterpoint, look at the opinions of someone 
involved in the 'normalisation' process: Josep M. Aymà Allò que no 
se sol dir de la normalització linguistica Barcelona: Empuries, 1992. A 
phlegmatic, undramatic and sharply critical approach to the issues 
involved is adopted in: Jesus Royo Una llengua és un mercat 
Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1991. Returning to the other camp in the 
politico-cultural debate, though in Galicia now, there is another 
passionate testimony, by way of a denunciation of nationalist excesses 
relating to 'normalisation' of the use of the Galician language: Manuel 
Jardón La normalización linguistica, una anormalidad democràtica 
Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1993. Finally, a balanced historical and philological 
interpretation of the Castilian language (the object of all sorts of absurd 
symbolic and political aggressions from the nationalist periphery) in 
its role as a truly peninsular lingua franca and a koiné for the Iberian 
peoples, at least at some important crossroads in Iberia's turbulent 
history: Angel López-Garcia El rumor de los desarraigados. Conflicto 
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ideological divide, who fall over themselves to recast widespread 
preoccupations—loaded with deep emotion and memories—felt 
by the majority of the citizenry into a political problem. In fact, a 
problem is created where none existed, only deep sentiment and 
primordial emotions rooted in people's memories. It is difficult to 
see which is worse, whether the delirious excesses of reason 
alienated by ideology and sectarianism, or the rash pragmatism of 
political leaders who unscrupulously use any instrument at hand 
to increase and maintain the power they have acquired. 
Irresponsible and disproportionate actions and statements—in a 
foolish action and reaction dialectic—combine with cloaked 
ambition and provoke controversies which unavoidably acquire a 
confrontational dimension 72.
The challenge thrown down by the Manifesto of the 2300— 
whether intentional or not, this can only be ascertained by asking 
each of the signatories—was quickly taken up by the nationalists, 
backed by important sectors of public opinion stirred by reports in 
the press. In the heat of the moment—and as a result of much 
more important events 73—an exacerbated and very militant
72 The evocative concept of schismogenesis here comes to mind (see, for 
example: G. Bateson (1936) Naven Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University 
Press, 1958).
73 Most important of all, the attempted military coup d'Etat of 23rd of 
February 1981, and the anti-autonomist policies on the part of the 
Madrid government which were indirectly brought about by it. The 
Manifesto de los 2.300 was published in the Madrid press on 12 March 
1981, a few weeks after the coup, adding new elements of ambiguity 
and lack of opportuneness to it. The events of 23-F—and the political 
withdrawal it caused in Madrid, with very negative effects on the 
process of devolution to the autonomous communities already under 
way—no doubt contributed to increase exacerbation on the part of 
nationalist sectors in Catalonia and elsewhere. It would be interesting 
to investigate to what extent such political exasperation was indirectly 
driven by fear raised by the above-mentioned events. A fear which is 
interiorised and indirectly revealed in heightened radicalism and rigid 
fundamentalist attitudes, irredentist overtones in discourse, etc. But 
this line of interpretation is clearly out of place here (But, see for
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nationalist movement emerged that rallied around the banner 
raised by 'Crida a la Solidaritat, in defence o f the Catalan 
language, culture and nation’. The Call for Solidarity movement 
initiated and largely led a resounding campaign, often with the 
barely hidden support of high Catalan institutions, already under 
the control of the CiU nationalists. One of the culminating events 
of the campaign was the Som una Nacid ('We are a Nation') 
festival held in the CF Barcelona stadium on the 24th of June, 
1981. The stadium overflowed with people, symbols and flags, 
nationalist slogans, rituals to exorcise the enemy without and its 
supporters and sympathisers within, messages proclaiming 
absolute truths concerning the nature of the nation.
In parallel to the political agitation, still centred around the 
Crida a la Solidaritat but well supported by various nationalist 
groups, a campaign was waged to raise awareness about the 
language issue and the situation of Catalan in particular. This 
was subsidised by the Catalan Generalitat and carried out with 
the collaboration of local bodies and all types of civic associations 
and support groups. The resulting 'Campaign for Linguistic 
Normalisation in Catalonia', drawn up to perfection and 
organised by advertising experts, quickly gained the widespread 
backing of local Catalan institutions, was received positively by 
the Catalan citizenry and doubtlessly was decisive in raising 
awareness on the situation of Catalan as well as the need to 
change certain habits forcibly acquired during the decades of 
political suppression and official and officious subordination of 
Catalan to Castilian 74.
example Vamik D. Volkan The Need to Have Enemies and Allies 
Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson Inc., 1988).
74 See relevant articles from the book by Miquel Strubell i Trueta 
Llengua i poblacio... Also, K. Woolard Bilingualism and the Politics... 
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The slogan of the campaign: El Catala, cosa de tots, the 
character created to put across the message, La Norma, along 
with revived slogans like: En Catala, si us plau became 
enormously popular and passed into the mythological treasure 
chest of a renascent Catalonia, which longed for the full recovery 
of its specific language. On its various levels, and employing 
different instruments (some neatly democratic, others maybe in 
the fringe) the process of 'linguistic normalisation'—the 
cornerstone of the Catalan 'national reconstruction' 
programme—progressed on a wave of civic support which, in 
turn, was propelled by strong political determination based on a 
wide partisan consensus. Inevitably, there have been instances of 
excess and patterns of behaviour of doubtful legitimacy 75.
One of the aims of the above-mentioned campaign was, in 
the words of the director general of Linguistic Policy, to create a 
favourable environment for the linguistic normalisation policies 
on the Generalitat’s agenda, which were due to be systematically 
implemented once the Law of Linguistic Normalisation was 
passed. The aim was also to create a positive attitude towards the 
law itself (which was already being debated in the Catalan 
Parliament) on the part of the public, in order to ensure that it did 
not become irrelevant as a result of poor public support once it 
was passed. If these were the objectives of this imaginative 
campaign, then it could be said that it was a great success, its 
results surely exceeding expectations 76.
Since the time the LLN was passed by the Catalan 
Parliament in 1983—with the full support of all parties except a
75 I refer, for example, to the excessive zeal and the occasionally 
inquisitorial style of some of the 'normalisation' officials appointed by 
the Generalitat, which led them to be known in some quarters with 
the derisive label of 'linguistic commissars'. See: Azahara Larra Servet 
Extranjeros en su pais op. cit.
76 La campanya per la normalitzacio lingulstica de Catalunya, 1982 
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few minor groups—the Generalitat has meticulously implemented 
a far-reaching 'normalisation' plan, of a wide political and 
administrative scope. The figures of the linguistic censuses of 1986 
and 1991—to cite neutral indicators—are clear proof of the 
success of such policies, reflecting, as they do, the spread of the 
knowledge of the regional language among the population. The 
headway made by Catalan during this period, as the language of 
instruction in public education institutions (now under the 
administrative control of the the Generalitat), in the mass media 
and in cultural activities, etc. has also been decisive. The progress 
made as regards its social uses and in the non-public spheres is 
also undeniable, although it is much more difficult to measure and 
evaluate 77.
On a symbolic level—which, as everyone should know, is of 
transcendental importance!—the 1992 Olympic Games celebrated 
in Barcelona provided a great opportunity, of which full 
advantage was taken, to promote the status of the Catalan 
language vis a vis a truly international audience. Catalan was one 
of the official languages of the Games, the first in which messages 
and information were announced over the loud speakers and the 
one in which key personalities began their speeches (the president 
of the IOC, for example, himself a Catalan). The symbols of 
Catalonia: the colours of the flag, the unofficial 'national anthem' 
Els Segadors, the 'national dance' the sardana—ensign par  
excellence of Catalan culture and folklore—were conspicuous 
throughout the Games' opening ceremony.
Public areas in towns throughout Catalonia were bedecked 
with Catalan flags, as were many balconies in Barcelona. The 
youth sections of CiU and ERC, along with those who rallied 
around the Crida a la Solidaritat banners, took advantage of the
77 See: Miquel Siguan La Espaha plurilingue op. cit. chapter 4.1; J. 
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occasion to carry out their own agitation and propaganda 
campaigns, primarily with the aim of attracting the attention of 
the cameras and the international media. With this intention in 
mind, banners with the slogan Freedom for Catalonia (originally 
in english) were hoisted high at every occasion, with apparently 
no preoccupation about the probable incongruence of this, given 
the circumstances.
The rapid progress made in the 'normalisation of the 
Catalan language' process is admired by sociolinguistic experts, 
who can view the case dispassionately since they are distanced 
from it 78. In some nationalist circles, however, this is judged 
insufficient. Thus, radical nationalists harp upon the dangers of a 
reversal in the process, and demand that consistent legal and 
institutional pressure continue to be exerted to ensure the 
dominance of Catalan at all levels throughout the region, as soon 
as possible.
It seemed that the storm had somehow lulled a little after 
the successes on the occasion of the Olympic Games, when, 
suddenly, another linguistic battle whipped up the waters yet 
again. This new storm was triggered by the 'linguistic immersion' 
educational policies and plans of the Conselleria d'Educacid of the 
Generalitat de Catalunya to implement them more widely and 
with increased momentum following the initial 'experimental' 
stage. These 'linguistic immersion' policies and techniques have 
been put into practice in Catalan schools over the last three or 
four years, especially in the towns of industrial belts around 
Barcelona and Tarragona, with the aim of achieving a rapid and 
radical linguistic assimilation of school-age children from 
Castilian-speaking families in Catalonia. The policy entails 
teaching children fully in Catalan from the very beginning of their 
primary school education.
78 As for example: Charlotte Hoffman An Introduction to Bilingualism 



























































































- 8 7 -
At this point, a group of parents of Castilian-speaking 
families, invoking the constitutional right to choose the language 
in which their children are taught, launched a protest campaign 
against the above-mentioned policies of the Generalitat at the 
beginning of the 1993-94 academic year, and lodged formal 
complaints with the administration and with the courts which 
culminated in the case being taken to the Catalan Territorial High 
Court in Barcelona, and later on to the Spanish Supreme Court in 
Madrid. Following deliberations on the complaint brought 
forward by the parents, the Supreme Court decided to open a case 
against the LLN itself, and address it to the Constitutional 
Tribunal, as it considered some of its articles might be 
unconstitutional 79. The Catalan High Court, in turn, considered 
in its sentence that the LLN was perfectly within the bounds of the 
Constitution, whereas some aspects of its application by the 
Generalitat's administration infringed the LLN law itself 80.
On the 23rd of December 1994 the Constitutional Court 
pronounced its own sentence on the issue. This sentence is 
basically in line with what the Catalan Territorial High Court had 
previously sentenced. Thus, it reaffirms the constitutionality of the 
law, yet it makes detailed juridical considerations as to the proper 
interpretation of some of the articles subject to controversy. 
Moreover, in replying to some of the arguments worked out by the 
Generalitat in its appeal, the Constitutional Court unambiguously 
rejects the idea that it is the Government (that of the Generalitat 
in this case) who makes all decisions concerning the language to be 
used for the teaching of children at each of the educational
79 A previous action brought against this law and taken to the 
Constitutional Tribunal, led to two of its sections, of lesser importance, 
being declared null and void.
80 In the El Pais educational supplement on the 8th of March 1994 a 
thorough overview was published on the controversy surrounding 
the Generalitat's pretensions to forge ahead with the 'linguistic 
immersion' program during this academic year and the legal action 




























































































institutions under its responsibility, and not the individual pupils 
or their parents on their behalf. And by explicitly invoking basic 
constitutional principles and the rights of the individual as 
established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, grants 
the individual pupils—or the parents on their behalf—the right to 
choose the language in which they are to be taught at every level 
of the educational system.
Events related to this latest language controversy— 
significantly centred on the Catalan case, with only references in 
passing to the other autonomous communities where similar 
problems obtain—have been thoroughly reported by the press in 
Barcelona and Madrid. As a result, the debate becomes wider and 
new elements are introduced which fuel the controversy and add 
an undeniable political-partisan dimension to the whole issue, 
which is in part understandable in the light of the fundamental 
principles involved 81. On their part, the parents who brought the 
complaint forth insist that their fundamental and constitutional 
rights are respected, and denounce the practices of the 
Generalitat's administration and the nationalist ideologies behind 
them: 'Territories don't have a language of their own, people do, 
and we have the right to an education for our children in our "own 
language" (in an obvious sibylline reference to a beloved concept 
on the part of Catalan linguistic authorities)' 82.
In the middle of this controversy, a draft version of proposed 
new Law of Linguistic Normalisation was leaked to the press. It 
had been drawn up by the Generalitat Government and sent to the 
parliamentary groups as a preliminary step in the process that 
would eventually lead to it being passed in the Catalan
81 It would be too long-winded to make reference to all the open letters, 
manifestos and counter-manifestos signed and made public by 
individuals and public institutions from one and the other side of the 
field, in relation to this politico-linguistic controversy, so I will only 
make reference to the essentials of the matter.
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Parliament. The explicit objective of this new bill was to 'give new 
impetus to the linguistic normalisation process', the first stage 
having been successfully concluded. In the introduction to the bill, 
mention is made of the necessity to uphold the right of every 
citizen 'to use the official language of their choice in their dealings 
with the Catalan public administrations, and to be dealt with in 
the same'. The general objective is to 'increase the social use of 
Catalan'. Moreover, article 14 of the new law would specifically 
aim at giving full legitimacy to the linguistic immersion policies 
mentioned earlier on, thus implying that Catalan, 'as Catalonia's 
own language', would be the sole language used at all levels of 
education. This article would replace that of the 1983 LLN which 
expressly recognises the right of every citizen to receive an 
education in their own first language, as indicated by the pupil or 
by his or her parents.
The implicit political aim of the proposed new law would 
doubtlessly be the full catalanisation of the educational system at 
all levels, by more thoroughly relying on the 'principle of 
territoriality' and giving fuller legal status to the ambiguous 
concept 'own language'. Another core principle of the new law 
would be the introduction of what is referred to as 'positive 
normalisation enactment measures', that is to say, positive 
discrimination measures in favour of Catalan—justified by its 
status as a minority language which would still be in need of 
institutional support due to its weaker position in its day-to-day 
interaction with Castilian. These measures would be analogous to 
the affirmative action policies implemented in the USA by the 
Democrats during their period in power in the seventies, aimed at 
overcoming ethnoracial inequalities in North American society. 
Such are some of the political principles behind the proposed new 
law, which would introduce pro-Catalan language policies 
thoroughly subsidised with public money; the obligation for public 



























































































- 9 0 -
in their cultural productions and activities in Catalonia; and, 
equally, sanctions against all companies or public agencies who 
infringed the 'normalising' precepts of the law 83.
A key element on this most recent language controversy— 
which mainly affects Catalonia, as it has been pointed out 
already—is one of great political transcendence for the whole of 
Spain. Namely, the start of a hitherto unheard of collaboration 
between the Catalan nationalists in office at the Generalitat and 
the socialists in office at the Spanish Government—of which 
certain politicians and important public figures in other 
autonomous communities feel quite jealous, launching all sort of 
attacks against what they consider an opportunistic political pact 
contra natura. When the socialists lost their parliamentary 
majority in the general elections of 1993, Felipe Gonzalez turned 
to the Catalan CiU and the Basque PNV nationalists for support, 
even going as far as to offer them a place in government. The 
political implications of this fundamental choice doubtlessly run 
deep, and surely were not overlooked by those who made it at the 
time.
The outcome was, however, that neither nationalist party 
accepted the offer of entering the Spanish government, although 
they did provide—and have since then provided, particularly 
CiU—the parliamentary support required by Felipe Gonzalez to 
form a new government and to pass the annual budget. In 
exchange for this parlamentary assistance, the Catalan 
nationalists have secured concrete concessions—regarding, for 
instance, the direct assigning to the Generalitat of a proportion of 
an important direct tax, the IRPF, as a way of advancing towards
83 The draft white paper drawn up by the Generalitat was published in El 
Pais newspaper on the 10th of November, 1993, pp 21-23. It seems by 
now that this legislative project has been put aside indefinitely, 
perhaps waiting for a more favourable political climate to be brought 
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greater levels of self-financing of the autonomous government—; 
as well as firm promises to open up a broad debate on economic 
policy, the financing of the autonomous administrations, and 
further devolution of powers to them. In other words, a highly 
significant negotiation having to do with core issues that will 
affect the nature of regional governments—and the Generalitat's 
in particular—and, consequently, the future constitution of the 
Spanish State itself 84.
In congruence with this new phase in the life of the Spanish 
polity and the redrawing of the institutional basis of the State, the 
President of the Senate summoned the Presidents of all the 
autonomous governments to take part in a special session to 
discuss on the 'state of the art' concerning the autonomous 
administrations, ways to proceed towards the culmination of the 
processes of devolution, and specifically the constitutional routes 
open to convert the Senate into a properly territorial chamber. In 
his speech the President of the Spanish Government Felipe 
Gonzalez clearly set an agenda for the desirable culmination of 
'devolution' to the autonomous governments—that is, of those 
processes of great scope initiated with the approval of the 
Constitution in 1978, which will gradually bring about a radical 
change in the territorial organisation of the State. Thus solving, 
he points out several times in his speech, the 'centuries-old' 
problem of the territorial 'vertebracion' (integration, articulation) 
of Spain—and this is one of many obvious echoes in his speech of 
Ortega y Gasset's political ideas. In his turn, the President of the 
Generalitat Jordi Pujol starts his speech by making a pedagogic
84 Although quite reluctantly in the beginning, it now seems that the 
Basque Government—led by the nationalists of the PNV—will also 
take part in what is starting to look like some sort of 'consociacionalist' 
negotiation process with the Spanish Government in Madrid. 
Unfortunately, the very serious political scandals which have come to 
full light lately, have considerably muddle the waters and put in 





























































































effort to explain to his audience what is the true nature of the 
Catalan nationality: its roots in history, culture (language would 
be paramount in this respect), and a profound sense of identity. He 
sets his own agenda for 'devolution', pointing out to basic claims 
and interests at stake for Catalonia. And on several occasions he 
insists on the need to view Spain as what in reality is: a 
plurilingual, pluricultural and plurinational entity.
An important element of the negotiations between the 
Spanish Government and the Catalan Generalitat has to do with 
the Generalitat's wish to have a greater say in the drawing up of 
European policy and direct participation in decision making 
processes in the European arena. This will eventually imply to be 
allowed direct representation in various institutions and 
representative bodies of the European Union. Doubtlessly, the 
gaze of Catalonia is increasingly directed to Europe, since it is 
aware that it is at the European level, as much as within Spain 
itself, that its economic future lies and will be decided, along with 
its political aspirations to become a distinct entity. However, this 
notion that Catalonia's 'national' problems can only be definitely 
solved in the European arena, in heading towards a 'Europe of the 
peoples', 'of the nationalities' ... or 'of the regions'—what does 
the label matter, anyway!—is by no means new and, in fact, has 
long been present in Catalan nationalist political thought and 
doctrine. Such political philosophy and expectations are also 
shared by illustrious thinkers in other parts of Iberia—the 
'regenerationist' school of thought, for example—, and others 
who are more difficult to categorise, who were convinced that 
Europe is also the most convenient 'solution' for Spain as a 
whole 85.
85 See, for example, (osé Ortega y Gasset Europa y la idea de nación 
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